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 Relations between the United States and China have become immensely complex 
since China’s militaristic and economic rise in the 1990s and the convolution of their 
relationship continues to grow as China begins to play a more prominent role on the 
world stage. This thesis examines three areas of how the United States is affected by 
China’s militaristic and economic rise to include the United States ability to aid Taiwan, 
threats to US space-based assets, and the emergence of China as an economic 
superpower. Although each area being examined is inherently different, all three areas 
illustrate an evolving China that the United States will have to contend with in the future. 
Each chapter demonstrates the varying degrees of how the United States is affected and 
analyzes the potential implications produced as a result of a growing China. Through the 
examination of existing literature, each chapter depicts a China prior to a particular 
militaristic or economic advancement and then explores the effects of those changes and 
how they affect the United States. The aftermath of these military or economic 
advancements by China reveal a willingness to grow, modernize, and contend with the 
major players in the international community. This thesis demonstrates the direct 
contention in which China’s advancements bring to the United States, clarifies the 
realities of this rivalry, and offers alternatives in relation to strategy and policies for each 
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 The United States is often regarded as the most powerful country in the world 
from both an economic and militaristic perspective. As a superpower currently 
unmatched by any single country, the United States has exhibited why it is the most 
powerful country in the world through its “power of influence, persuasion, and leadership 
on the international stage,”
1
 as well as displaying its military technological prowess and 
economic might. While the United States currently enjoys the advantages that come with 
being the most powerful country in the world, other countries are jockeying for authority 
and power, and no country is currently pushing to challenge the United States more than 
China. 
 The developing country of China has shown its eagerness for authority and 
power, and the economic and militaristic advancements that China is striving towards 
will continue to provide the country with increasing leverage. The swift turn around in 
what was once considered a backwards country began in the late 1970s when China 
renounced its Soviet-style central planning and instituted a market economy. The opening 
of its doors to western countries ushered in an economic revolution that would turn China 
into an economic powerhouse that many believe will challenge the United States in the 
near future. China’s open-door policy opened the eyes of the country’s leaders, helping 
them to realize the economic potential that China possessed.  
And with their eyes opened, China’s leaders would realize how antiquated their 
military was when compared to the United States as they watched the events of the Gulf 
War unfold in the early 1990s. The realization of having an outdated military would put 
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China on a path to improving its military; however, the price of building a modern 
military would prove costly for the still developing nation. Understanding that an 
overhaul of their entire military would be exorbitant, China would instead focus on 
advancing specific elements of its military. The military elements that China elected to 
update were tailored to fit the country’s national security interests, as well as focus on the 
weaknesses of countries that posed a potential threat.        
 This thesis paper is an amalgamation of three research studies that concentrate on 
how the United States is affected by China’s economic growth and advancements in 
military technology. While other research has been conducted on the topic of China’s 
rise, this paper focuses on specific areas of contention between the United States and 
China, and provides a unique perspective on China’s military and economic rise. Each 
chapter in this paper focuses on potential issues that have risen as a result of China’s 
economic growth or advancements in military technology, and addresses these concerns 
through the use of historical research, counterfactual arguments, and predictive analysis. 
While each paper tackles a different question pertaining to either China’s economy or 
military, the culmination of all three studies aids in illustrating how China’s rise affects 
the United States.  
 The first chapter of this paper illustrates where China’s rise began and focuses on 
the rapid growth of the Chinese economy. Although China’s economic growth began in 
the late 1970s this chapter primarily focuses on China’s economic rise since 2001 and 
how their rise constrains the US economic instruments of power. As the only country 
currently positioned to overtake the United States economic output, China’s rapid 
economic growth has some US policymakers concerned. Using existing literature and 
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studies on the topics of economic power transition, China’s economic rise, and the Sino-
US symbiotic relationship, this chapter illustrates the constraints that China’s rise places 
on the United States. After weighing the positive and negative consequences of the Sino-
US economic relationship and comparing previous economic power transitions to today’s 
Sino-US economic transition, this chapter predicts the likely outcome as a result of China 
becoming the world’s largest economy. Although China is poised to surpass the United 
States as the world’s largest economy and the continuing growth of China’s economy 
may hinder the United States ability to exercise its economic powers, this chapter argues 
that China’s challenge to the United States is not as dire as some might believe because 
the economic instruments of power are far more complex than other instruments of 
power. Combined with the lack of trust in the Chinese government and concerns about 
China’s political stability and social unrest, the United States will continue to lead the 
world economy and direct the international community.       
The second chapter of this paper explores how the United States’ ability to aid 
Taiwan during a cross-strait battle with China would be affected by the military 
technological advancements that China has made since the 1996 cross-strait conflict. 
Through historical research this chapter illustrates how antiquated China’s military was 
prior to the mid-1990s and the steps that the country has taken to improve its military 
power. With no event between the United States and China equal to the 1996 cross-strait 
conflict, it is difficult to assess how effective the military improvements that China has 
undergone are against the United States.  Using the 1996 cross-strait conflict as a 
baseline, this chapter creates counterfactual arguments to assess how US forces would be 
constrained as a result of China’s military modernization. Considering varying plausible 
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scenarios, this chapter provides context in how China might utilize its military 
improvements against the United States if another cross-strait crisis were to occur and 
argues that the United States will likely have to pursue other avenues as a result of 
China’s military improvements. 
The third and final chapter of this thesis portfolio examines the impact that 
China’s development of direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons will have on the 
United States’ ability to rely on its space-based military advantages in the future. As a 
country that is heavily invested in space-based assets and relies on satellites for both 
military and civilian use, the United States has a vested interest in taking steps to protect 
these assets. Until early 2007, it was believed that only the United States and Russia had 
the capability to destroy satellites in space with direct ascent weaponry. When China 
decided to display their ability to destroy assets in space, it showed the United States that 
they would have to take steps to protect their space-based assets in the event that a Sino-
US conflict erupted or if the United States elected to aid Taiwan during a cross-strait 
conflict with China. This chapter relies on existing literature regarding the topic of 
implications resulting from China’s successful trial of its direct ascent ASAT weapon in 
early January of 2007 and how the weapon is a persisting threat towards US space assets 
to create counterfactual arguments. With a lack of space based policies in place and space 
emerging as another domain of war, this chapter attempts to draw out the discussion of 
the significance of China’s direct ascent ASAT program and explore what options the 
United States could exercise in response to this developing threat. Options explored to 
combat China’s use of direct ascent weaponry include diplomatic actions, technological 
responses, and military options. The end of this chapter will argue that the United States 
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cannot exercise just one option, but must take a multifaceted approach to solving how to 
protect its space-based assets against this growing threat. 
These three topics were selected to highlight China’s rise because together they 
epitomize the growing strength of this developing nation. This paper begins with China’s 
economy because it accentuates where China was prior to opening its doors to trade and 
becoming an economic powerhouse that is able to rival the other major economies of the 
world today. Through the creation of a strong economic basis, China was then able to 
focus on developing its military. The topic on how China’s military technological 
advancements affect the United States ability to aid Taiwan is important to explore 
because it illustrates how China’s military is gaining parity with regards to being able to 
contend with the military superpowers of the world. The last paper also focuses on 
China’s military advancements; however, the topic of how China’s direct ascent 
weaponry affects the United States space-based military advantages was selected largely 
because the accomplishment that China achieved is one of the pinnacles of military 
technology, only two other countries had achieved this ability, and it has major 
implications for the United States military. Together, these three topics depict a country 








How China’s Booming Economy Affects the United 
States Economic Instrument of Power 
Introduction 
 For two thousand years China had been the largest economy in the world until it 
was overtaken in the late nineteenth century by the United States (US).
2
 Now, after a one 
hundred and fifty year hiatus and “being a weak player on the world stage,”
3
 China has 
awakened and reemerged as a major power, spawning competition between the rapidly 
rising power and the United States.  The rise of China has sparked interest and 
opportunity, as well as doubt and fear for many Americans. Across the spectrum China’s 
leaders are making strides to advance the country, but no area of progression is more 
evident than the ascension of China’s economy. Although China lacks the leadership 
experience of the United States within the international community and would not 
challenge the United States with its military in the midst of modernization, the emergence 
of China as an economic superpower has forced the United States to make difficult 
adjustments and make room for the country that will soon surpass the United States 
economically barring any setbacks. 
 The effort of this paper is to assess how China’s economic rise since 2001 
constrains the US economic instruments of power. Using the British transfer of economic 
power to the United States after World War II as a case study, an attempt will be made to 
explain how China’s growing economic power will constrain US economic instruments 
of power as China emerges as a world economic superpower. The paper argues that 
China’s economic challenge to the United States is not as dire as many fear. China today 
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 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4. 
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 Ibid., 4. 
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is still a developing country and is currently positioned to extend its growth over the next 
two to three decades
4
, eventually overtaking United States economic output in 2039.
5
 
However, because the economic instruments of power are more complex than other 
instruments of power, the United States will continue to lead and direct the international 
community and world economy. Although China is positioned to surpass the United 
States in terms of global gross domestic product (GDP), reasons for why China will not 
replace the United States as the country that will direct the international community and 
world economy includes lack of trust in the Chinese government and concerns about 
China’s political stability and social unrest.  
Methodology 
 To assess how China’s booming economy effects and constrains the various 
instruments of US economic power, this paper will compare and contrast previous 
economic power transitions to today’s Sino-US economic transition, and attempt to 
predict the likely outcome as a result of China becoming the world’s largest economy. 
Through the examination of existing literature and studies on the topics of economic 
power transition, China’s economic rise, and the Sino-US symbiotic relationship, this 
paper attempts to bring to light the economic constraints that China’s rise places on US 
economic instruments of power. Beginning with an introduction of the United States 
ascension to economic superiority and transition of economic power from the British to 
the United States, a brief history will be provided in order to have an understanding of 
what previous economic power transitions during the era of freer trade resembled.  
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In order to compare and contrast China’s economic rise to the United States’ 
economic rise, it is paramount to illustrate the history behind China’s rise prior to 2001 
when China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and opened its markets to 
foreign investors. An understanding of where China was in terms of being an economic 
leader prior to this time will further lend hand to comprehend how China is able to 
quickly climb the economic ladder and why their climb could constrain the US economic 
instrument of power.   
 After depicting what China was like prior to 2001 and how China has risen in 
economic standing, a portrayal of the Sino-US symbiotic relationship and how failure on 
either side could be detrimental to the health of both economies will be conveyed. 
Research demonstrates that while China and the United States are intertwined and 
enveloped in an interdependent relationship, it is through this symbiotic relationship that 
US instruments of power are constrained. This paper then addresses the various areas of 
economic influence that the United States is unable to tackle as a consequence of the 
symbiotic relationship and how that affects the overall United States economy. 
Afterwards, a segment depicting the international community’s view of China is provided 
in order to illustrate why the international community will continue to follow the United 
States as the director of the economic world even though China will surpass the United 
States’ economic output. 
 After examining the rise of United States’ economic power and the rise of China’s 
economic power, the constraints of the symbiotic relationship between the two countries, 
and the international community’s views of China, an assessment will be made on 
whether or not China will replace the United States as the top economic superpower and 
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how that may constrain US economic instruments of power. Through comparing and 
contrasting the rise of the two countries and examining the relationship between them, 
this chapter explains why the threat of China’s economic rise is not so imminent, great, or 




 For the purposes of this assessment it is critical to understand the definition of power 
from a broader perspective and then briefly dwell into the varying categories of economic power 
and how they are interconnected. According to Edward Carr, power, in relation to foreign affairs, 
is defined as ‘the ability to influence the behavior of others to achieve a desired outcome.’
7
 To 
have economic power is the ability to utilize a nation’s wealth as leverage in order to 
influence others.
8
  What consists of the economic instrument of power expands from 
sanctions and foreign aid to export controls and trade policies, and further “includes the 
sheer size of the U.S. economy as having an influence on the rest of the world” and the 
effects of the world on the United States economy.
9
  
 Economic competition is not a zero-sum game and is far more complex than any 
other instrument of power.
10
 In essence, “Country A may be richer than Country B, but 
both will be better off through trade if the other grows richer.”
11
 This is not meant to 
insinuate that economic power is meaningless and for governments the ability to wield 
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economic power is of great concern. According to Deanne Julius, author of “US 
Economic Power: Waxing or Waning?,” there are five types of economic power. 
Although these types of power are not referred to directly in this paper, it is important to 
briefly address the varying types of economic power in order to conceptualize how 
instruments of power beyond the economic are affected. The first is the ability to ‘buy 
more might’ or to build up a country’s military power.
12
 The second type of economic 
power, termed ‘carrot sticks,’ is the “ability to achieve foreign policy objectives through 
the deployment of national economic resources.”
13
 The third economic power type is the 
ability to ‘tilt the playing field’ by bending the rules of economic engagement towards 
favoring a country’s domestic firms or consumers.
14
 Hyper-competitiveness which is the 
fourth type of economic power is defined as having such a “favorable economic climate 
that its firms would gain dominant positions in key industries or innovative areas so that 
firms from other countries could not catch up” or successfully compete.
15
 The fifth and 
final category is referred to as soft power which is the ability to ‘attract others by the 
legitimacy of [a country’s] policies and values that underlie them.’
16
 For the United 
States, economic soft power is dependent on the attractiveness of its economic model and 
values. 
 As economic globalization continues to progress and United States 
interdependency grows, poorer countries will continue to benefit and grow faster, and the 
United States will see an erosion of economic power in return for a stimulus for United 
                                                          
12
 Julius, ”US Economic Power: Waxing or Waning?,” 15. 
13











 The eventual outcome will be a multi-polar world economy in 
which no economic bloc or country dominates, and every country is constrained by the 
international rules of open trade and fair competition which will benefit every country.
18
  
Transition of Economic Power: Britain to the US 
After the Napoleonic Wars, Britain emerged as the global economic power 
becoming the “foremost trading nation and the first to industrialize.”
19
 The first golden 
age of the liberal world economy began with the freer trade era in the 1860s when Britain 
and France signed the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty, which began as a simple bilateral 
agreement that later laid the foundation for a wider liberalization of trade.
20
 By 1867, 
Britain with the assistance of France had developed a working system that lowered tariff 
barriers and reduced restrictions on trade with colonies, allowing the trade agreements to 
expand to thirteen European nations.
21
 While Britain resumed its status as the economic 
power, especially within the European trade bloc, the country saw a relative decline in 
economic power during the last quarter of the 19
th
 century; however, the undoing of the 
British trade system began with World War I.
22
 Wartime protectionism destroyed the 
liberal economic order and any hope of restoring the prewar system of trade and 
finance.
23
 The onset of the Great Depression dealt the final blow as nations raised tariffs 
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 Arthur A. Stein, “The hegemon’s dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the 
international economic order,” International Organization 38, no. 2 (1984): 361, 
http://search.ebscohost.com. 
20
 Stein, “The hegemon’s dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the international 
economic order,” 366. 
21
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22
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and devalued their currency.
24
 The United States followed suit in 1930 adopting the 
“ultraportectionist Smoot-Hawley Tariff…[displaying] their reluctance to assume the 
mantle of leadership,” and their unwillingness to follow the British.
25
 
Only after World War II (WWII) had the United States learned its interwar 
lessons and utilized its “formidable power and prestige”
26
 to reorganize the global 
economy and rebuild Europe. Understanding that worldwide recovery was contingent 
upon intra-European trade, the United States offered aid under the Marshall Plan in 





Britain, the United States role as the economic hegemon after WWII was to make an 
asymmetric bargain.
28
 The United States opened its own boarders in return for easing 
protectionism,
29
 “nondiscrimination, and stable exchange rates.”
30
 Under the Bretton 
Woods system the capitalist world flourished and the economies in Europe and Japan 
recovered from the war.
31
 Established in 1944, the Bretton Woods system created a basis 
for exchanging international currency and led to the establishment of the International 
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which 
later became known as the World Bank.
32
 Under the Bretton Woods system, states that 
decided to become members agreed to fix their exchange rates by linking their currencies 
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to the United States dollar and would agree to purchase and sell US dollars to keep their 
currencies within 1% of the fixed rate.
33
 In order to assure the rest of the world that the 
dollar was dependable, the United States linked the dollar to gold; “$1 equaled 35 oz. of 
bullion.”
34




By the early 1960s the United States ran a habitual “balance-of-payments” deficit 
resulting in the United States inability to cover foreign-held external dollar liabilities with 
US gold reserves.
36
 With an expanding deficit and the United States economic priorities 
focused on funding the war in Vietnam and full employment instead of issues 
surrounding the dollar, the United States boosted inflation which prevailed throughout the 
world causing “countries participating in the Bretton Woods system, which disfavored 
inflation,” to lose trust in the United States.
37
  The Bretton Woods system would 
eventually collapse due to foreign exchange markets expecting parity adjustments and 
increased speculation in the United States ability to cover foreign-held debt.
38
 In 1971, 
President Richard Nixon would sever the link between the dollar and gold ending the 
Bretton Woods system.
39
 The aftermath of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
eventually led to most of the major world economies allowing their currency to float 
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freely against the dollar by 1973.
40
 During the 1970s in wake of the global oil crisis and 
the Vietnam War, the United States lost some of its prestige and leadership and from it a 
collective leadership between the United States, Japan, and West Germany emerged.
41
 As 
the Cold War came to a close in the 1990s, the collective leadership faltered as Japan’s 
economy slowed to a crawl and “Europe turned inward to pursue an ambitious regional 
integration project.”
42
 The United States emerged as the sole economic superpower and 
led the world economy into the new century by sustaining global economic growth with 
its boom in consumer spending and imports.
43
 
The liberal world economy has held up considerably well despite the terrorist 
attacks on 9/11 and the subsequent attacks in Madrid, London, and Indonesia. Having 
endured two recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and despite high defense spending and 
consumer profligacy, the United States is still continuing its leadership but from a 
position of weakness rather than strength.
44
 With China joining the WTO in 2001, China 
has rapidly emerged as an economic superpower, rivaling the United States. 
A Brief Description of China Prior to 2001 and how China 
Climbed the Economic Ladder 
 In order to comprehend China’s economic rise since 2001, it is imperative to have 
a broad understanding of China’s economy prior to the turn of the century. Illustrating 
what China’s economy was like before the turn of the century will give the reader a better 
understanding of why China was previously not considered an economic powerhouse and 
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explain how China was able to grow its economy at such a rapid rate. Before China 
became the global economic powerhouse that it is today, a much different China existed. 
Beginning in the 11
th
 century, countries in Europe began surpassing China in fields such 
as “science and technology, the utilization of natural resources…the management of a 
country with a huge territory,” and real income per-captia.
45
  From 1820-1952 the world 
experienced great growth and European countries and Japan had seen the growth of total 
world gross product increase eightfold and per-capita income increased fourfold and 
threefold respectively.
46
 China on the other hand had seen a decline in its GDP from 32.4 
percent of the world in 1820 to just 5.2 percent in 1952.
47
 From 1952-1978 China went 
through a process of industrialization that accelerated its economic growth, however this 
developmental process was relatively slow in comparison with the rest of the prospering 
world at the time.
48
  
In the early 1970s China was a poor, backwards totalitarian country that was 
isolated from the rest of the world and still enwrapped in Mao Zedong’s Cultural 
Revolution which began in 1966.
49
 Mao had turned society upside down, closing schools 
and calling on students to become “Red Guards” and make revolution on those 
professionals who were defined as bourgeois experts.
50
 In 1969 the country was on the 
brink of total anarchy until the People’s Liberation Army was able to restore order and by 
1971 Mao had reached out to US President Nixon in hopes of ending China’s “two-
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 China under Soviet-style central planning had one 
of the lowest per capita incomes in the world despite a respectable economic growth at 
6% a year in 1975.
52
  By 1978 the de facto leader of the People’s Republic of China, 
Deng Xiaoping, had renounced the Stalinist-style central planning and instituted a market 
economy, opening the country up to foreign trade and investment.
53
 Deng had realized 
that China’s backwardness stemmed from its closed-door policy while Western countries 
had undergone the industrial revolution that included trade and open markets, and he 
intended to roll out the welcome mat for foreign investors.
54
 
 After a 30-year-plus market-oriented reform and the shift from an isolationist 
country to one that embraces economic globalization, China had gone from rags to riches 
in some respects.
55
 From 1978-1997 foreign trade in China increased at an average pace 
of 15.6 percent annually, surpassing the growth rate of its economy.
56
 The quality of 
China’s products were raised due to the rigors of international competition and 
consequently improved businesses, “so that by the late 1990s China was ready to take the 
big step of joining the WTO and opening up its domestic markets.
57
 Just as the United 
States economically caught up with Britain and when Japan caught up with the United 
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Sino-US Symbiotic Relationship 
 The interdependent economic relationship between China and the United States is 
one of great concern for many Americans. However, because of the symbiosis between 
the two countries’ massive economies, there is a distinct incentive for both countries not 
to shake the relationship or politically stir things up.
59
 Currently the United States is 
China’s largest overseas market and is the “second largest source of its foreign direct 
investment.”
60
 With a high degree of openness to the world economy and foreign trade 
accounting for 75% of China’s GDP, the functionality of China’s economy is contingent 
on “other countries for its domestic prosperity and stability.”
61
 Keeping good political 
relations with key market countries such as the United States, Japan, and European 
countries is essential to preventing backlash and shutting China out of their markets.
62
 
Shutting down any of these key markets could be devastating for China’s economy, 
causing an economic slowdown and raising domestic unemployment to hazardous levels.  
 As a country with over 1 billion people, 300 million Chinese remain desperately 
poor and only 300 million are considered middle class when measured against American 
middle class standards.
63
 High unemployment, growing social unrest, and pervasive 
poverty have further fueled the demand for China to expand its economy.
64
 According to 
one Senior Chinese official, political and business leaders are tasked with having to find 
jobs for 24 million people a year due to 10 million new workers entering the labor market 
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 At the time this article was written in 2005, China was only able to fulfill 
under half of that order, putting more pressure on China’s leaders to expand the 
economy.
66
 Because the United States is China’s largest overseas market, China can ill 
afford to have the United States close its markets.     
In 2013 China acted as one of America’s main bankers, holding approximately 
$1.6 trillion in “U.S. Treasury securities, U.S. agency debt, U.S. corporate debt, and U.S. 
equites,” which was ranked second only to Japan.
67
 The United States debt at the time, 
according to the Congressional Budget Office, was estimated at roughly $16.7 trillion.
68
 
What has allowed China to purchase such a large amount of US debt is the manipulation 
of the system and keeping China’s currency, the renminbi (RMB), artificially low by 
applying a fixed rate instead of pegging their value to the dollar.
69
 The fixed rate of the 
RMB has provided comfort for foreign investors, protecting them from inflation and 
currency inflation.
70
 With incentives such as a fixed currency and cheap labor, companies 
and industries are moving their jobs and factories to China where products can be 
produced “20 to 200 percent cheaper than their competitors.”
71
 This makes it exceedingly 
difficult for other countries to compete. 
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While it is often argued that China has artificially set the value of the RMB low, 
approximately 8.3 RMB to the dollar, thereby making “China’s goods unbeatably priced 
to foreign buyers,” and contributing to the US trade deficit and hurting US 
manufacturing, consumers worldwide acknowledge that they have enjoyed a higher 
standard of living.
72
 Any surplus gained by China can be attributed to its dominance in 
the market system and that system also allows “nations to maintain current account 
surpluses, as long as their surpluses…[are] recycled back into funding the US current 
account deficit.”
73
 The purchasing of US T-bills (Treasury bonds) by China and other 
countries lends the money back to the United States so that the cycle can repeat itself 
over and over again.
74
 Through keeping the demand of these securities high, China has 
kept the repayment interest rate low, which in turn has allowed the American consumer 
to enjoy relatively low interest rates.
75
 Furthermore, the purchasing of foreign exchange 
holdings has proven necessary in order to stabilize the RMB and US T-bills provide the 
safest return on investment.
76
  
  Of the other benefits that result from the Sino-US symbiotic relationship is the 
movement of environmentally damaging businesses to China. The United States 
manufacturing industry is forced to adhere to environmental regulations that their 
Chinese competitors are not plagued with.
77
 China has continuously failed to enforce 
internationally recognized labor and environmental standards, providing yet another 
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advantage that allows for quicker and cheaper production.
78
 Evidence of China ignoring 
factory pollution control standards can be observed in the haze over Los Angeles, which 
according to the Environmental Protection Administration, 25% can be attributed to 
China.
79
 While the loss of American jobs is a negative repercussion of moving hazardous 
industries from United States soil, the positive side is that there is a reduction in 
environmentally hazardous industries and less pollution in the United States.   
The Constraints of the Sino-US Economic Relationship: RMB, 
Labor and Trade Practices, and Environmental 
RMB 
Some Americans perceive the economic relationship between China and the 
United States in a negative light and view China’s economic rise as a national security 
threat. Over the last 10 years China’s semi-capitalist system has grown at an average 
GDP rate of 9% a year, eclipsing the United States 3.3% over that same time period.
80
 It 
is important to remember that a developing country, such as China, is expected to benefit 
and grow more quickly than a country that is already developed and established. At some 
point in the future China’s growth is expected to slow and plateau. While a symbiotic 
relationship exists between the two giant economies, many in the United States are 
concerned about the consequences of that relationship and how that affects businesses in 
the United States.  
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One of the major concerns that some top level officials are troubled with is the 
United States dependency on China to finance our budget deficit.
81
 United States 
overspending and lack of saving, by both the government and consumer, have cast the 
United States into its current situation. United States profligacy has allowed countries 
such as China to take advantage of these circumstances and become enablers of United 
States overspending by allowing the United States to “rack up huge budget deficits 
without raising interest rates that would hurt [US] consumer spending.”
82
 Due to the 
United States need for China to continue to buy up US debt through T-bills and other 
dollar assets, the United States has handcuffed itself and is constrained in utilizing its 
other instruments of power to coerce China to make changes to some of its policies.  
An example of one constraint is the United States inability to force China to raise 
the value of the RMB or force China to allow its currency to float on the world currency 
market. According to Carolyn Bartholemew, a member of the US-China Economic and 
Security Review commission, China is “not playing by the rules,” echoing the concern of 
the American business sector.
 83
  Suppressing currency or keeping the value of currency 
artificially low is a “form of government subsidy prohibited under WTO rules.”
84
 The 
low labor costs and unethical trade practices in conjunction with an artificially low 
currency and the dismissal of environmental standards have allowed China to put out a 
product at an unbeatable price that has not only affected United States manufacturers in a 
negative way, but also “factories and workshops from Mexico to Africa and South 
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 and other countries around the world. While the United States has put pressure 
on China to reevaluate the RMB or let the RMB float by threatening to take China before 
the WTO, a conundrum persists that is twofold. 
First, while China’s leaders have attempted to accommodate United States 
interests by slightly increasing the value of the RMB from 8.3 to 8.1 against the dollar, 
and allowing the RMB to float within 0.3 percent in either direction,
86
 China’s leaders 
fear that any extensive rise in value of the RMB could be detrimental and further widen 
the gap between China’s rich and poor. Other subsequent effects from raising the RMB 
or allowing the currency to float on the world currency market include the loss of 
“exports, slowing of growth…[an increase] in unemployment, and risking unrest.”
87
 
While the central bankers of China would like to see the RMB float because it would 
allow them to “manage the macroeconomy without one hand tied behind their backs,”
88
 
China’s political leaders don’t want to risk sending their economy into a tailspin in order 
to accommodate the United States.   
The second issue is that a significant increase in the RMB would result in higher 
prices for the United States consumer. As prices in China rise, other competitors within 
the same industry would better be able to compete with China’s products. While this 
could lead to a resurgence in United States manufacturing in some industries, the Oxford 
Economic Forecasting model predicts that raising the RMB won’t have too much of an 
impact on the Sino-US bilateral trade deficit because China still exports more products to 
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the United States than the US exports to China.
89
 With its global trade surplus, China 
purchases more than it sells to its Asian neighbors and the rest of the world excluding the 
United States.
90
 While it is unlikely that China’s leaders in the near future will allow the 
RMB to float due to the turmoil it would cause within its own country, the repercussions 
of China allowing the RMB to float could be equally devastating to the US budget crisis. 
By allowing the RMB to float, China would “no longer be forced to risk inflation by 
accumulating dollar assets to keep the…[RMB’s] value” stable.
91
 Instead of reinvesting 
some of its surplus into the United States economy, China could select to reinvest its 
earnings within the country instead of abroad. If China were to stop reinvesting in the 
United States, dire consequences would be the result for the United States economy.  
The Sino-US symbiotic relationship and China’s attempts to limit the value of the 
RMB has its share of risks and benefits. As stated previously, China’s purchasing of 
United States debt has kept interest rates low and has ultimately led to a better quality of 
life for Americans as well as those in other countries. While bilateral trade between the 
United States and China weighs heavily in China’s favor, Americans benefit from a 
consumer standpoint being able to consume goods at a low price. The downside to this 
aspect of the relationship is the reduction of jobs in the United States. Other concerns 
expressed by some United States policymakers include the fear of China’s large and 
growing holdings of U.S. securities posing a risk to the United States economy, 
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especially if China elects to divest large amounts of its holdings.
92
 Another concern 
argued is that China’s holding of large amounts of debt gives China “leverage over the 
United States on economic and noneconomic issues.”
93
 On the other hand, it can be 
argued that China’s large holdings of US securities gives the country very little leverage, 
since selling off large amounts of US securities would diminish the value of its other 
foreign exchange holdings and negatively impact their own economy.
94
 
Labor and Trade Practices 
Another constraint caused by the Sino-US economic relationship is the United 
States’ inability to affect China’s labor and human rights practices, and unethical trade 
practices. Despite the fact that China may surpass the United States in terms of world 
GDP in the future, Chinese workers won’t surpass United States workers in terms of 
income per capita anytime soon. As a share of GDP, Chinese worker’s wages have fallen 
from 53 percent of GDP in 1992 to less than 40 percent in 2006
95
 and the average 
manufacturing wage was equal to 60 US cents.
96
 As previously stated, unemployment 
and the discrepancies in economic equality-levels are rising due to corruption and 
malfeasance. In many factories and mines the working conditions are abysmal and there 
is significant evidence that China is systematically violating workers’ human rights 
according to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
97
 With such a high 
demand for jobs, it is easy to replace workers if there are disagreements about pay or 
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working conditions.  According to the Fair Labor Association, there have been serious 
issues surrounding the veracity of reporting work hours and overtime pay in factories.
98
 
The ability to force such low wages on workers is due in part to China’s labor policies 
which were “designed to attract foreign investment and boost export competitiveness.”
99
 
In many factories, managers have been coached on falsifying work records to disguise 
unpaid overtime.
100
 While the United States has had labor disputes with China over unfair 
wages and human rights, many actions with regards to monitoring unacceptable 
conditions usually result in factories losing large contracts and having to layoff 
workers.
101
 The reduction of jobs only creates a more difficult economic environment and 
tends to be detrimental to the employees that need the wages.
102
 Since becoming a 
member of the WTO in 2001 and gaining normal trade status with the United States, 
much of the leverage that the United States once held with respect to reviewing human 
rights conditions has been lost.
103
 If wages of Chinese workers were to rise, the American 
consumer would also see a rise in the prices of products. 
With regards to unethical trade practices, Chinese companies have further hurt 
industries in the United States through counterfeiting and piracy. Many marquee 
American companies have lost profits due to a lax enforcement of intellectual property 
rights to include “widespread piracy of medicines, DVDs, CDs, and brand-name 
products.”
104
   While the United States has urged the Chinese government to crackdown 
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on illegal trade practices,
105
 little has been done in terms of enforcement. Many of the 
intellectual property laws passed in Beijing are not regularly enforced and in many cases 




 As stated earlier, much of the pollution created in China can be seen in the haze 
over Los Angeles. Since many companies and industries from all over the world are 
moving manufacturing, production, and assembly plants to China because of their lax 
environmental standards, as well as cheap labor, China has become the world’s largest 
greenhouse gas emitter.
107
 According to the World Health Organization, 656,000 people 
are killed annually due to air pollution and another 95,600 due to water pollution, and 
many more suffer from respiratory and other diseases that can be attributed to poor 
environmental standards.
108
 According to a study published by Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, air pollution emissions attributed to Chinese 
manufacturing, production, and assembly plants has “resulted in one extra day or more of 
noncompliance with the US ozone standard in 2006 over the Los Angeles area and many 
regions in the eastern United States.”
109
 
 Furthermore, China’s preoccupation with expanding the economy and creating 
jobs has led to neglected agricultural needs. The North China Plain, which stretches from 
Shanghai to well north of Beijing and is an area that produces half of the country’s wheat 
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and a third of its corn, has seen decreasing rainfall due to climate change and depleted 
water aquifers.
110
 As an increasing number of young people continue to move from rural 
China to the cities to avoid pollution created by Chinese industrialists who have focused 
on building in the countryside due to lax labor and environmental law enforcement,
111
 a 
growing amount of water is being diverted from farmers to the cities.
112
 This mass 
exodus to the cities by young people has forced China to build dams in the mountainous 
southwest in order to expand irrigated areas and offset some of the water losses 
elsewhere.
113
 Consequences as a result of building dams includes the displacement of 
human inhabitants, the flooding of “some habitats…[the reduction of] water flow to 
others, and…[alterations to] weather patterns.”
114
 In addition to taking a toll on plant and 
animal life, the building of dams, such as the Three Gorges Dam, imperils fish 
populations downstream where there are dense human populations and fishing is a staple 
of life.
115
 As water scarcity increases, China will turn to the rivers in the Himalayas 
where neighboring countries including India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Pakistan are engaged in 
a ‘water grab’ and tensions are high.
116
   
 Linked to China’s water scarcity is the threat of a food shortage. As a country that 
is already “struggling to contain food price inflation,”
117
 the yearly dust bowls that China 
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faces is removing important top soil that is needed for planting crops.
118
 After economic 
reforms in 1978, China shifted farming responsibility from large state-organized 
production to individual family farms.
119
 The shift in farming responsibility has led to a 
dramatic increase in raising livestock which in turn has led to overgrazing. The stripping 
of vegetation due to overgrazing has led to reduced agricultural fields and has prolonged 
dust bowl seasons leading to the expansion of deserts.
120
 The reduction of agricultural 
lands has forced China to begin importing food and lease land in other countries for the 
purposes of growing crops.
121
 Implications for the United States that could emerge as a 
result of China not being able to feed its people and China purchasing US debt include 
forcing the United States to share some of their grain harvest.
122
 For China, the growing 
possibility of food and water scarcity threatens China’s social and political stability, as 
well as its ability to expand its economy.
123
 
The United States, as well as the international community, have taken notice and 
are working to “assist in the process of developing China’s approach to environmental 
protection” and shape the evolution of China’s future.
124
 The United States has a strong 
environmental enforcement apparatus and has a history of public participation in 
environmental protection practices.
125
 The environmental and ecological issues that 
China faces present the United States with a nonthreatening vehicle to advance United 
States interests in China and undoubtedly creates an opening for “US multinationals and 
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venture capitalists…seeking opportunities in China in the fields of clean energy and 
environmental technologies.”
126
 The challenge for the United States is getting China’s 
political and industrial leaders onboard because implementing new policies could result 
in an economic slowdown and concerns regarding full employment continue to weigh 
heavily on the country’s leaders.
127
   
Constraints Due to Competition for Resources 
Now that China has become an industrialized nation and an automotive society, 
China has cast its “entry into the global competition for Earth’s limited energy 
supplies.”
128
 Due to its expanding economy, China has driven up world commodity prices 
on materials such as “metals, minerals, and other raw materials.”
129
 All the petroleum that 
China had needed up until the mid-1990s had been produced in-country.
130
 Now that 
China is the second-largest petroleum consumer, at 6.5 million barrels per day in 2004, 
China is moving outside the country to fulfill their petroleum needs, driving oil prices 
above $60 a barrel.
131
 China currently believes that the majority of the more reputable 
energy supplying countries such as Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia have been claimed 
by the United States, Japan, and various European countries.
132
 Under that logic China 
has turned to less reputable countries such as “Sudan, Venezuela, Iran, and Burma,” 
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thereby undercutting the efforts of the United States and its allies to use “boycotts and 
other economic levers to force these countries to improve human rights.”
133
  
While China’s efforts to acquire resources in order to continue its economic 
expansion add to the friction between Sino-US relations and creates more problems for 
the United States in attempting to turn China into a responsible world power, the United 
States must realize that China’s thirst for resources comes from its expanding economy. 
Although the efforts of the United States and its allies are sometimes rendered ineffective 
when dealing with China being opportunistic when sanctions and boycotts are in place 
against rogue or less reputable states, the United States does have some power in 
managing how much China deals with rogue or less reputable nations.
134
 China is often 
stymied in East Asia because of the US-led coalition of regional states and is often forced 
to move outside of the region to fulfill is resource needs.
135
 If the United States were to 
ease some of its containment policies in the region, in order to purchase China’s good 
behavior, the United States might be able to effectively continue with sanctions and 
boycotts against rogue or less reputable nations.
136
 
Lack of Trust in China 
 One aspect that should not be overlooked is the reputation that China holds with 
regards to the international community. The United States has “won over, however 
begrudgingly, the international community” and wields powers of “influence, persuasion, 
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and leadership on the international stage that that no other state comes close to.”
137
 It is 
this international legitimacy fueled by a global coalition of the willing that will aid in 
continuing to propel the United States to the forefront of economic leadership and it is 
only until state allegiances to the United States breakdown will China potentially have an 
opportunity to direct the world economy.
138
  
China on the other hand has done little to win over any allies and has often found 
itself in contention with a number of regional neighbors over geopolitical issues. In their 
never ending quest for resources, China has strained relationships in the region. As noted 
earlier in the environmental section of this paper, the unilateral decision to build dams in 
rivers that originate in China and flow to neighboring states facing water scarcity issues, 
such as India, Nepal, and Bangladesh, has raised regional tensions. Adding to the tension 




In addition to causing discomfort to their neighbors to the south, territorial claims 
by China is also raising tensions to nearby east and southeastern states. While current 
relations with Taiwan are relatively stable, issues regarding Taiwan joining mainland 
China arise periodically as China’s impatience grows and Taiwan’s leaders wrestle with 
claiming independence.
140
 Further fueling rising tensions in the East China Sea are 
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disputes between China, Taiwan, and Japan over who owns the Senkaku Islands.
141
 In the 
South China Sea, China has attempted to lay claim to roughly 90 percent of the region to 
include the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Shoal.
142
 However, both the 
Philippines and Vietnam are also laying claim the Paracel and Spratly Islands and states 
such as Malaysia and Brunei are vying for their share of maritime control.
143
 In addition 




In addition to stirring up regional tensions and striking fear into smaller 
neighboring states, the international community has often been dissatisfied with how 
China has conducted itself in relation to both domestic and international issues. With 
regards to international issues, China has often sat on the periphery of the international 
decision making process and has cavorted with questionable allies such as North Korea 
and other states that the United States and its allies have placed sanctions and boycotts 
against.
145
 One recent example of China failing to act was when the international 
community was creating a UN resolution condemning the brutal oppression of President 
Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
146
 Instead of disavowing President al-Assad’s actions, China 
held up the UN resolution and selected to remain on the sideline arguing that the conflict 
was part of Syria’s internal affairs.
147
 From a domestic standpoint, many of the concerns 
that the international community has with how China conducts itself domestically have 
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already been stated above. Such concerns include China not following WTO regulations 
and currency manipulation, unfair trade practices, human rights and labor practice issues, 
restrictions on religious freedom, lack of democratic values, and many more. For China 
to supplant the United States as a country that will direct the world economy, China will 
have to readdress its approach on how to handle domestic, regional, and international 
issues, prove to the world that China is capable of leading, and improve its reputation.  
The Relative Decline of the US Economic Instruments of Power 
and Rise of China as an Economic Superpower  
 Upon review of the literature on the Sino-US symbiotic economic relationship 
and the constraints of that relationship, it appears that the Sino-US economic ties and 
deepening interdependence will continue to constrain and erode United States economic 
power for the coming two to three decades despite the United States making strides 
towards more effective budget spending and returning to living within its means. While 
predictive GDP economic scales and models reveal that China will surpass the United 
States by 2039, thus cutting into the United States 20.3 percent global GDP, China’s 
economic rise will not be enough to replace the United States as driver of the global 
economy. The lack of prestige and trust that surrounds China, as well as the frailty of its 
economy and political instability, will continue to hinder the country and cause many to 
question the country’s overall stability. 
 During the freer trade era, the United States is currently the only country that has 
surpassed and replaced the previous economic superpower. China’s economic growth 
comes at a different time and under different circumstances, including the current 
economic superpower still standing. Using the information throughout this paper, an 
34 
 
effort will be made to compare and contrast the economic rise of the two countries and 
take into consideration the symbiotic relationship in order to determine how US 
economic instruments of power may be constrained as China’s economy maintains its 
rise. 
It is no surprise that the United States is in a state of economic decline and China 
is on the rise. After reviewing different articles, economic predictive scales, and current 
trends, almost every study unanimously predicts that China will surpass the United States 
as the economic superpower in the coming two to three decades. However, few of the 
articles attempt to predict the repercussions or consequences of China’s rise to surpass 
the United States and how that affects the US economic instruments of power. This paper 
concedes that China will surpass the United States, but will not become a dominant 
leader on the world stage; however the US economic instrument of power will be 
weakened. 
The economic rise of China is developing under different circumstances than the 
United States economic rise. The United States rise as the economic superpower came in 
the midst of reconstruction after WWII, in which many of the assembly and 
manufacturing industries in Europe had been destroyed during the war. Because 
European countries and Japan were in the midst of recovery, the United States had the 
strongest economy and was the only country with the ability to produce goods and aid in 
the reconstruction after the war. This allowed the United States to pick up the mantle of 
leadership from the British and establish “international systems and institutions”
148
 that 
would allow the United States to become the “world’s banker, the guardian of 
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international monetary stability, and the open market of last resort, thereby facilitating the 
international movement of goods, capital, technology, and people.”
149
  
China on the other hand had been aloof from the rest of the world because of its 
closed door policy and remained a backwards state until Deng Xiaoping rolled out the red 
carpet for foreign investors. Although China arrived late to the game, the opening of 
China’s markets and joining the WTO in 2001, revealed the need for change within the 
country to accommodate rapid influx of employment needs. As a result of China pegging 
the RMB to the dollar and having lax labor and environmental regulations, China has 
been able to rapidly expand its economy and beat the competition’s prices.  
In many ways China is doing for the United States, what the United States did for 
the European countries after WWII. The tragic events of the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to 
two simultaneous wars and high levels of defense spending, despite “a weak dollar and 
record current account and fiscal deficits.”
150
 Although China is not reinventing the 
wheel as the United States re-organized the economic system after WWII, they are now 
one of the primary creditors to the United States and facilitate much of the international 
movement of goods. Through the purchases of T-bills, countries such as China have 
recycled money back into the United States economy, needing it to succeed in order to 
supplement their own economic growth. The difference in circumstances is that the 
United States is still considered one of the strongest economies, although the United 
States economy is in relative decline, and China will have to compete with that 
                                                          
149
 Mastanduno, “Rivals or Partners? Globalization and US-China Relations,” 45. 
150
 Ibid., 46.  
36 
 
superpower. One other difference is the now interdependent relationship that requires 
both countries to economically succeed for the other to survive. 
While many are concerned about China becoming an economic superpower, equal 
concern needs to be given as to whether or not China can maintain its growth. The 
research in this paper has shown the consequences of this interdependent relationship and 
for the United States, the collapse of China’s economy could be equally detrimental for 
the health of the United States economy. Despite its booming economic expansion, China 
still faces a multitude of inner-country problems such as a growing unemployment rate, 
an aging labor force, a widening gap between the rich and poor, environmental concerns, 
health issues, and eventually removing the peg from the RMB. As time progresses, 
China’s political leaders will need to address these issues, and this will inevitably result 
in a reduction in economic growth. These internal issues will hinder China from gaining 
further ground past the economic juncture on the world stage for two reasons. First, 
China may need to put its aspirations of projecting its power internationally on the 
backburner in order to address domestic challenges.
151
 Second, for a relatively poor 
country such as China to command respect, inspire followers, and have influence abroad, 
it needs to have “soft power, such as democracy, an open society, or pluralistic 
values.”
152
 China’s poor business and trade practices, as well as the treatment of its 
people do not reflect the values of a leader worth following, and its political and social 
instability remain questionable.  
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Being in debt to China provides little wiggle room for the United States to 
implement its economic instruments of power to address improving human rights 
practices, and granting individual and religious freedoms,
153
 as well as revising labor 
practices and environmental regulations. While United States political discourse is 
moving towards protectionism, knowing that the United States is one of China’s main 
markets, China is viewing the United States requests for change as an infringement of its 
state sovereignty.
154
 The prodding by the United States has at times revealed thin veiled 
warnings of casting the world economy into turmoil by selling off chunks of US holdings 
if provoked.
155
 While China’s economy would most certainly suffer the loss of the US 
markets, it is unclear whether China would be willing to cast the world, as well as its own 
country into economic turmoil.  
With regards to China seeking resources, the United States needs to realize that 
China is expanding its global reach to keep the economic machine humming. While the 
United States at times has criticized China for openly undercutting US sanction and 
boycott efforts by conducting business with these countries, the United States either 
needs to make room for China or China will take what it needs in order to expand its 
economy. United States economic power will continue to erode for the foreseeable future 
but in return the United States will continue to expand its economy.  
Although the US economic instruments of power may continue to erode due to 
the Sino-US economic relationship, this paper has also illustrated the United States’ need 
for China’s economy to succeed. When China opened its doors to the world market, it 
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was expected that their economy would grow at a quicker rate than the US economy 
since China would have the most to gain from this economic trade relationship. As trade 
between the two major economies commenced, Americans began to enjoy a higher 
quality of life and China’s economy began growing at an unprecedented rate.  As stated 
at the beginning of this paper, economic competition between countries is not a zero-sum 
game, and therefore both countries will continue to grow richer through trade, despite one 
country surpassing another on an economic scale. As a result of trading with China, the 
United States was forced to balance the erosion of economic power with growing the 
United States economy. For the United States to regain some control of its economic 
instruments of power, especially when leveraging its power against China or less 
reputable countries that are trading with China, the United States needs to consider ways 
to revise its spending budget and reduce its deficit with China. 
Conclusion 
The conclusion of this paper recognizes that China will supersede the United 
States in terms of global GDP and eventually cut into the US global share. This does not 
mean that United States income will fall, but it does mean that those earnings will 
account for a smaller piece of the world’s economic pie.
156
 While China’s piece of the 
world economic pie will be larger than the United States, China will not displace the 
United States as the driver of the world economy. The lack of trust and prestige held by 
China is great, and concerns surrounding its political stability and social unrest will 
continue to plague China past 2039. While opening the floodgates and allowing China to 
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enter the global economy has constricted and eroded US economic power within China 
and the corrupt countries that China deals with, the best solution for the United States 
will be to manage these dealings as much as possible. While the symbiotic relationship 
between China and the United States presents quite the conundrum for the United States, 
it would be prudent to begin assessing how to relieve the debt held by China. In the end, 
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How China’s Military Technological Advancements 
Affect the United States Ability to Aid Taiwan 
Introduction 
 Since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the United States has stood 
between China and Taiwan. Although United States involvement between China and 
Taiwan was originally seen as a short term buffering zone to stop the spread of 
communism, United States relations with Taiwan have expanded despite a signed joint 
communiqué in 1979 that reasserted the United States recognition of China and Taiwan 
as one.
157
 With the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act, just months after the joint 
communiqué, the United States affirmed support for the democratic system of the island 
and promised to “ensure that Taiwan’s democratic status not be altered by outside 
force.”
158
 According to China, the Taiwan Relations Act violated or stretched the 
agreement of the joint communiqué. This is the crux of the intermittent friction between 
China and the United States, and is one of the driving forces behind China’s quest to gain 
military technological advancements.
159
 Since the United States naval deployment to the 
strait during the 1996 Taiwan Strait conflict, China has accelerated it’s strive for military 
modernity in order to balance and deter the United States and its allies. 
This paper assesses how China’s military technological advancements since the 
mid-1990s have affected the United States ability to intervene in a Chinese invasion of 
Taiwan. Through existing literature, this paper will examine the capabilities and 
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implications of Chinese military advancements in the three areas mentioned above, and 
how these factors constrain the United States ability to project power in littoral and blue 
water areas, and forward deployed bases in the region. Littoral, blue water, and forward 
deployed bases represent the different components of the United States ability to aid 
Taiwan and how China is attempting to constrain areas of US power projection. Using 
the 1996 Taiwan Strait conflict as a case study, the paper will explain the outcome of the 
crisis and how Chinese military advancements may dictate a different outcome today, in 
which the United States would not be able to preside or aid Taiwan during a cross-strait 
crisis. Based on the technological advancements that China’s military has made since the 
mid-1990s, this paper assesses three hypothetical scenarios to illustrate the possible 
outcomes of a future crisis and how China’s military technological advancements may 
constrain US forces. The reason for implementing hypothetical scenarios is that no events 
of heightened tension have escalated to a point that is equal to the 1996 Taiwan Strait 
crisis and history has revealed no existing cases through which to ascertain the possible 
effects of China’s changed military capabilities. The conclusion of this paper recognizes 
the success of past US interventions but argues that China’s military advancements may 
deter future US military involvement resulting in a need for more robust dialogue and 
diplomacy. 
In 1996, a cross-strait conflict between China and Taiwan erupted when Taiwan 
sought to increase its claims of independence by holding its first presidential election.
160
 
During the crisis, China deployed 150,000 troops to the Fujian Province bordering the 
strait, conducted live-fire missile tests close to Taiwan’s two most important seaports, 
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and performed live-ammunition amphibious landing exercises to intimidate Taiwan.
161
 
Claiming that China had been “‘reckless’ and ‘provocative,’”
162
 the United States 
deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups to areas near Taiwan to monitor the situation. 
Although China had declared that their intentions were to intimidate Taiwan and warned 
the United States not to intervene, and that no actual invasion or attack was planned, the 
United States deployed its forces because of lack of trust and miscommunication.
163
 At 
the request not to intervene by the Chinese government, the United States continued to 
advance toward Taiwan, perceiving China’s conventional missiles as being “militarily 




With a military that dwarfs the United States in sheer numbers, China’s likelihood to 
equip the entirety of its forces with the most up to date technology that could rival the 
United States is unrealistic. Despite drastic economic growth over the past two 
decades,
165
 the cost of equipping all facets of China’s military with modern technology 
would be a hefty expenditure that China could ill afford. At the close of the Cold War, 
China perceived the influence of superpowers as diminishing,
166
 leading to a multi-polar 
world. Both the cost of developing a technologically advanced military and realizing that 
future wars between major powers would most likely occur on a regional scale
167
, in 
addition to studying the United States display of technology during the Gulf War, gave 
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way to China attempting to develop what might be perceived as a western military. This 
smaller force would be more maneuverable and equipped with high-tech gadgets that 
would pack precision, accuracy, and lethality. Thus, China had selected to “focus in on 
areas where it can immediately improve [its] military”
168
 capabilities, centering its efforts 
on developing technology that maximizes China’s relative strengths, while exploiting 
adversarial weaknesses.
169
 Although China has made vast technological improvements in 
all facets of their military, advancements in three areas, C4ISR (command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), the ability to 
attack an adversary’s C4ISR network, and strategic missile forces will have the greatest 
affect on constraining US capabilities to aid Taiwan.   
Methodology 
This paper uses counterfactual arguments to assess China’s military technological 
advancements and how they constrain US forces. As stated above, the basis of this paper 
is existing literature on the topic of China’s military technological advancements since 
the mid-1990s. To depict the advancements in military technology, it is necessary to 
illustrate the posture of China’s military prior to the acquisition of advanced military 
technology. While information on the status of China’s military preceding the 1996 
Taiwan Strait crisis is limited and vague, this paper attempts to re-construct a Chinese 
military prior to gaining advanced military technology. 
 After illustrating how China’s military was equipped prior to the mid-1990s, the 
research then shifts focus to military technological advancements that China made, 
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specifically to disrupt the United States ability to aid Taiwan in a future conflict. 
Research demonstrates that China has made strides to improve all aspects of its military, 
but specifically sought advancements in three areas: strategic missiles, C4ISR, and the 
ability to attack an adversary’s C4ISR network. After evaluating why China selected to 
focus on those military core competencies, this paper explains how technological 
advancements in these areas constrain United States power projection. 
 To test the theory that China’s advancements in military technology would 
constrain the United States ability to aid Taiwan in a cross-strait conflict, it is necessary 
to create counterfactual arguments. Since there has not been an event equivalent to the 
1996 cross-strait conflict, it would be difficult to assess the utilization of these advanced 
technologies and how they constrain US forces. Using the 1996 conflict as a baseline for 
creating a hypothetical scenario, this paper examines three plausible scenarios based on 
how US forces would be constrained if China had more technological advancements in 
strategic missiles, C4ISR, and attack C4ISR. The first of these scenarios will illustrate 
how China will utilize its military technological assets to reduce US capabilities and 
prevent US forces from intervening in a cross-strait conflict. In the second scenario, 
China demonstrates the seriousness of the situation by launching a missile to the 
perimeter of the theater of operations, forcing US naval assets to operate further from the 
locus of conflict. And the last scenario illustrates the plausible courses of action that the 
United States could take in the event that China’s military successfully deterred US 





It has been more than 30 years since the joint communiqué and China has remained 
undeterred from its goal of reunifying Taiwan with the mainland. While past attempts 
have failed, largely due to the aid of US forces deployed to the region in times of conflict, 
China has bolstered its military through technological advancements. For the purposes of 
this assessment, the definition of military technological advancements will be limited to 
the military capability or means that China has developed or acquired in order to deter the 
United States (and its allies) from interfering in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The term 
“blue water” navy refers to the ability to operate across the open oceans versus littoral or 
“brown water” navy that operates relatively close to shore.  
The acronym C4ISR, as spelled out above, can be broken out into C4 and ISR. The 
term C4 refers to “technologies and systems that provide command, control, 
communications, and computer processing,” allowing coordinated attacks and the use of 
precision force.
170
 C4 is what allows a technologically advanced military, such as the 
United States, to use “deadly violence with greater speed, range, and precision.”
171
 ISR 
technologies provide “the ability to gather, sort, process, transfer, and display information 
about highly complex events that occur in wide geographic areas,” giving the military a 
more real-time understanding of a situation.
172
 Together, the core capabilities of these 
systems render a “dominant situational knowledge” allowing a military to quickly reduce 
the “ambiguity of violent situations, to respond flexibly, and to use force” with precision 
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and accuracy where necessary.
173
 Because C4ISR encompasses such a broad range of 
capabilities, this paper will highlight only a few of those core competencies in order to 
illustrate how China would employ a more advanced C4ISR network.  
 
A Brief Description of Early 1990s Chinese Military Power to 
Understand Military Technological Advancements 
In order to understand China’s military technological advancements since the mid-
1990s, it is important to have a broad understanding of what China’s military was like in 
the early 1990s. Throughout the 80’s and into the early 90’s China’s military could be 
categorized as a ‘bare-bones’
174
 military, with basic military capabilities and no 
sophisticated modern technology.
175
 Well into the mid-90’s, China’s forces were armed 
with 1980s vintage armor and utilized dated “command and control, air defense, logistics, 
and communications.”
176
 Their military, although large, was equipped with weapons that 
were of low quality, limited range, and were not very maneuverable.
177
 In 1991, during 
the Gulf War, the United States displayed an awe-inspiring show of military power and 
technological prowess. At the time the Iraqi army was the fourth largest army in the 
world and equipped with Warsaw Pact military hardware.
178
 This large but outdated Iraqi 
military was quickly “demolished by better-equipped Western forces.”
179
 The United 
States unleashed some of its most advanced weapons including “stealth 
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 and a space network capable of providing 
“warning, communications, weather, multi-spectral imagery…navigation,” and superior 
command and control of its forces.
181
 The similarities in size and military capabilities 
shared between the Chinese and Iraqi military gave China’s military cause for concern. 
To China, this was a revelation and an “introduction to 21
st
 century tactics and weaponry 
that pointed out…the limits of China’s massive but antiquated military.”
182
  
The Chinese military is comprised of four branches: the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA), PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and the strategic missile force known as the Second 
Artillery.
183
 Into the early 90s China’s ground army continued to be the “center of 
gravity”
 184
 of their armed forces since China perceived that their major potential threat 
would be the Soviet Union and the idea of using “force to unify Taiwan with the 
mainland was relatively low on the list of China’s military priorities.”
185
 Equipped with 
dated Soviet T-55 tanks from the 1950s and 1960s, the same equipment fielded by the 
Iraqis during the Gulf War, and employing Mao Zedong’s doctrine of “‘human wave 
attacks’- having more soldiers than your enemy has bullets,” China was employing a 
tactic that would overrun the enemy with sheer numbers.
186
 
The Gulf War forced China’s leaders to reevaluate and restructure the military. Once 
comprising of 3 million poorly equipped soldiers in 1995, China had reduced the size of 
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its force to 2.3 million by 2005, largely cutting personnel from the ground army.
187
 By 
decreasing the size of the military, Chinas hopes to build “a smaller, more 
technologically advanced force” and focus on “applying information technologies to 
procedures and equipment to enhance capabilities.”
188
  In addition, China’s war doctrine 
was revised to “prepare the PLA to fight and win local wars under modern high-
technology conditions or local wars under informationalization conditions.”
189
    
By the late 1990s China still “possessed one of the most technologically backward 
defense industries,” with a “‘few pockets of excellence’ such as ballistic missiles.”
190
 
With a labor force of 600,000, China was only able to manufacture a dozen or so fighter 
aircraft a year, “mainly 1960s and 1970s-vintage J-8IIs and J-7s.”
191
 Even worse was the 
development of China’s navy, only able to manufacture one surface destroyer a year.
192
 
Deficient in several critical areas such as systems integration, electronic warfare, sensors 
and seekers, and aeronautics, China sought to bolster its military by procuring advanced 
technology from the Soviets.
193
      
Lagging behind the major military superpowers, China selected to focus its efforts on 
niche military capabilities such as their strategic missile force and C4ISR, while treading 
water elsewhere.
194
 Because China’s military is focused on targeting the weaknesses of 
the United States, China has only moderately invested in developing a modern air force 
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and navy, and often selecting to purchase and acquire military equipment from the 
Russians.  
Subordinate to the PLA, the Second Artillery Corps (SAC) is tasked with integrating 
and deploying China’s strategic missile force, and has emerged as the keystone of PLA 
military capability.
195
 Although missiles have been an integral part of China’s defense 
strategy since the 1950s,
196
 SAC first established a short-range ballistic missile (SRBMs) 
brigade targeting Taiwan in 1993.
197
 The first use of these SRBMs during the 1995-96 
strait conflict showcased the ability of SAC’s strategic missile-firepower. Despite the 
display, China’s missiles were ill-equipped for targeting moving vessels, such as the two 
US carrier groups deployed to the region during the 95-96 strait conflict, and were 
regarded as “militarily irrelevant spook weapons.”
198
 
The military and technological prowess that the US displayed during the Gulf War 
has led China to believe that the United States heavy reliance on information and C4ISR 
network is where the US military derives its power and advantage.
199
 Often defined as the 
“military nerve center,” disrupting United States C4ISR could paralyze components of 
the US military and/or drastically degrade the capabilities of individual platforms such as 
missile defense, fighters, and aircraft carriers.
200
 While the Gulf War in 1991 tipped the 
Chinese off to the importance and reliance of the US military on information networks 
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and C4ISR, the vast majority of China’s capabilities to affect or constrain United States 
C4ISR occurred after the conflict in 1995-96. Before 1991, China’s C4ISR system was 
“disjointed and void of interconnectivity” due to an aged and lagging national 
telecommunications infrastructure.
201
 However, by the end of 1995 China had assembled 
ten of the largest telecommunications networks in the world, creating a revolutionary leap 




Chinese Niche Technological Advancements: C4ISR Attack 
Capabilities, C4ISR, and Strategic Missile Forces  
The following section provides a brief overview of the technological advancements in 
these niche areas and how China may employ these niche capabilities in a future cross-
strait conflict. Current literature available on the subject of Chinese military 
modernization in relation to US involvement in a strait conflict focuses on China’s ability 
to deter and delay the United States involvement long enough to conquer Taiwan. The 
vast amount of research done on Chinese military technological advancements has 
centered on how these emerging technologies will be integrated into a strategy, first to 
deter the United States involvement, second to delay the United States involvement, and 
third to win a regional war if the United States intervenes.
203
 Deduced from this strategy 
and what has become the “dominant view in American Policy circles is that China is 
pursuing…an ‘access-denial strategy,’ aimed not at directly confronting U.S. forces but at 
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circumscribing, slowing down, and imperiling their access to the theater of operation.”
204
 
Similarly, the RAND Corporation employs the term “antiaccess strategy.”
205
 The 
difference between the two terms is subtle, but RAND’s definition includes a strategy 
that forces the US to operate “farther from the locus of conflict than they would normally 
prefer.”
206
 The development of Chinese military technology to deny US forces access to 
the theater of operations seems to be the main consensus among the literature currently 
produced.  
Although access-denial is the widely popular American interpretation of China’s 
strategy with regards to China developing new technology, Vitaliy O. Pradun of the 
Naval War College suggests that the military restructuring and organization of China 
emphasizes a missile-centric focus reflective of a more destructive purpose rather than 
merely pursuing access-denial.
207
 After examining the PLA’s wartime doctrine, Pradun 
makes the argument that the PLA’s doctrine contradicts the access-denial approach, 
suggesting the development of missile technology was to not only “achieve strategic 
surprise but to dismember U.S. assets,”
208
 and level the playing field.
209
 
Although the display of China’s missile forces during the 1995-96 conflict did little to 
deter the United States from entering the theater of operations, today’s SAC forces will 
force the United States to think twice before involving themselves in another cross-strait 
conflict. Now viewed as a “highly accurate, flexible, and lethal mode of precise and 
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 the SAC’s missile forces, which are comprised of a vast 
portfolio of missile capabilities and payloads, have become a force to be reckoned with. 
Advancements in missile technology have given China’s missiles the range, distance, and 
appropriate payloads that enable their forces to hold hostage any forward deployed base 
in the region. With the introduction of the medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) in 
1997, China would gain the capability to extend its defensive perimeter to approximately 
3,000 km and would enable the firepower of their SRBM units to focus on targeting 
Taiwan.
211
 A major technological advancement and a concern for the US navy is the 
advent of the anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). Equipped with a seeker capable of 
targeting US naval vessels,
212
 the only true blue water navy capable of sailing anywhere 
in the world without fear, may soon need to exercise caution before deciding to involve 
itself in China and Taiwan’s affairs. Over the next decade, China hopes to improve the 
accuracy and range of SAC’s missile forces via incorporating “more advanced inertial 
and satellite aided navigation systems, sophisticated terminal guidance systems, and 
increasingly powerful solid rocket motors.”
213
 
Through buttressing their C4ISR capabilities with more advanced and reliable 
technology, China hopes to gain information superiority and “gain the initiative in 
operations by making full use of various information fighting platforms in three 
dimensional space.”
214
 In order to accomplish these lofty goals, an advanced C4ISR 
platform capable of integrating human and mechanical functions, in “every single-
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dimensional space, such as ground, sea, air, space, and electronics,”
215
 is required. 
Although acquiring assets to enhance China’s C4ISR really began in the early 90s, the 
maturity, integration, and connectivity of these systems did not occur until after the 1995-
96 conflict. Through building up infrastructure to support C4ISR capabilities, China has 
made “informatization” the guiding PLA objective for developing its military.
216
 The 
principle of “informatization” stresses the integration of “information technology in 
weapons systems and their operation,” in order to conduct a comprehensive campaign.
217
 
Attack C4ISR assets that China has acquired and/or developed include the SC-19 
anti-satellite weapon, 
218
 high-energy lasers, both nuclear EMP and nonnuclear EMP 
attacks, and the ability to conduct computer network attacks.
219
 The advent of high-
energy lasers has given China the ability to temporarily blind and possibly destroy United 
States intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites, leaving the US 
military blind to developments occurring on the other side of the world.
220
 With the 
addition of the SC-19 direct ascent anti-satellite weapon, China also has obtained a way 
to permanently disable US ISR satellites in low elliptical orbit.
221
 The use of nuclear and 
nonnuclear EMP attacks will allow China to disable or degrade the United States and 
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The following section will focus on the three theaters of operations from which the 
US forces have the ability to aid Taiwan and how China is attempting to constrain areas 
of United States power projection with the technologies exemplified above. 
Understanding of the key areas that China has focused on developing technologically and 
the strategy behind these developments will enhance the comprehension of how China 
will constrain US forces with its technological advancements. 
 
Factors that Constrain US Blue Water Power Projection 
Currently the US navy is the only true blue water navy in existence, allowing them to 
project their power anywhere in the world. China understands US naval and air 
superiority, and acknowledges that they cannot win in a direct military conflict with the 
United States.
223
 Marshall Hoyler, a former professor at the Naval War College, agrees 
with Pradun’s assessment that China’s developmental military technology is missile-
centric, however he sides with the popular majority that believes China is integrating this 
technology with an access-denial strategy.
224
 Holyer argues that China’s home field 
advantage allows China to retain a numeric advantage that can overwhelm the US 
navy.
225
 What Holyer is referring to is that the anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) aboard US 
naval carriers and vessels would not be able to intercept an overwhelming concentration 
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of incoming anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), thus deterring US involvement.
226
 Both 
the procurement and development of ASBM systems by China was something that US 
forces did not have to worry about during the last cross-strait conflict, but will be 
something to contend with if a future conflict were to ensue. 
Another integral military advancement that China has sought out is the ability to 
attack US C4ISR.
227
 In the mind of the Chinese, the biggest US military vulnerability is 
their reliance on technology and information from C4ISR networks.
228
 According to 
Pradun, an attack on US C4ISR capabilities would offset or render irrelevant “American 
superiority in several key areas, including air defense and integrated naval warfare.”
229
 
While degradation in US C4ISR would not prevent the deployment of forces to the 
perimeter of the theater, US forces would be confined to operating further away from 
Taiwan due to an inability to coordinate operations, and collect and transmit early 
warning information.
230
 China’s acquisitions in capabilities that enable them to attack US 
C4ISR assets were an ability that was lacking during the last cross-strait crisis.  
Despite the fact that China has invested in an aircraft carrier and is developing naval 
aircraft, the current belief is that China would not deploy their aircraft carrier to engage 
with the US navy in a cross-strait conflict.
231
 In Daniel Kostecka’s article From the Sea, 
Kostecka states that the acquisition of an aircraft carrier was for future missions and is 
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more of a “nationalistic showpiece, with very little operational value.”
232
  The future 
missions that Kostecka was referring to were regional in nature and involved defending 
maritime territory and disputed islands in the South China Sea.
233
 While the article does 
not expand upon why China’s naval aircraft carrier would not be involved in a cross-strait 
conflict, Kostecka mentions that land-based aircraft was more likely to be used.
234
  
There are at least three reasons why the Chinese would not deploy the carrier: 1) 
China’s blue water navy would be out numbered, 2) out gunned, and 3) the purpose of a 
missile-centric force is either to deter the enemy from entering a territory or to draw the 
enemy within range of the missiles without sacrificing military hardware. As previously 
stated, China has only been able to produce a handful of destroyers capable of operating 
in the open ocean and have purchased too few Sovremenny class destroyers.
235
 With so 
few ships capable of supplementing and protecting a carrier from enemy destroyers and 
aircraft, it would be difficult to contend with two carrier battle groups. Additionally, the 
reason for employing missiles is that they are “cheap, fast, expendable, risk no friendly 
casualties, and…are difficult to preempt.”
236
 Furthermore they do not require air 
superiority and offer a high rate of defensive penetration,
237
 allowing air and naval assets 
to be allocated elsewhere.   
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Factors that Constrain US Littoral or Brown Water Power 
Projection 
Research on constraining United States power projection in littoral waters is sparse. If 
the United States were able to gain access to the strait, it can probably be assumed that 
the United States defeated or were able to evade China’s missile forces and project both 
air and sea power in the theater of operations. At this point it would seem that China 
would have to contend with a vastly superior US navy. While one can speculate as to 
why literature is lacking on China’s littoral naval capabilities it is important to note that 
China has invested in bolstering its littoral navy. According to David Slayton and Craig 
Hooper, China has invested in a large amphibious force that would enable China to 
“unilaterally project power well beyond Taiwan.”
238
 While this does pose a threat to US 
forces in the strait and along the coast of Taiwan, the authors stress multiple times that 
Washington believes China’s amphibious force is “almost entirely a non-issue.”
239
 
According to Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, China has also invested itself heavily 
in a submarine force.
240
 At the time of the 1996 conflict, China’s submarine fleet had 
consisted of four KILO class submarines that were acquired from the Russians and five 
indigenous HAN class submarines.
241
  While the timeline is unclear on whether or not 
China had a submarine force at its disposal during the conflict, what is clear is that China 
is pursuing a submarine fleet, developing a new SONG class diesel submarine and 
contracting out to the Russians for at least eight new KILO class submarines in 2002.
242
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Goldstein and Murray believe that the Chinese could create an effective submarine 
blockade in the shallow waters of the strait where US anti-submarine technology would 




Constraints of Forward Deployed Bases in the Region 
Research on constraining US airpower from forward deployed bases is another area 
that little is written about. Existing literature on the subject demonstrates that the RAND 
Corporation’s report on China’s anti-access strategy is the only report that incorporated 
the use of China’s military technology to disable forward deployed air bases in the 
region. According to the Mark Stokes’s study of PLA doctrine, China has reserved the 
“right to attack enemy targets on the territory of a third country if that country allowed 
the enemy to use bases on its territory in a conflict with China.”
244
 Through the use of 
airpower and China’s sophisticated missile force in conjunction with the access-denial 
strategy, China hopes to deter or delay the United States from projecting air power 
through targeting airfields. According to the RAND Corporation, the PLA Air Force 
doctrine aims to strike enemy air bases and surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, in the 
initial campaign in order to quickly degrade the enemy’s offensive capabilities.
245
 
Similar to how China would keep the US navy at bay through a C4ISR attack, China 
would apply an attack to bring down command facilities in Japan and South Korea, 
leaving the air bases without early warning and defensive capabilities.
246
 While China 
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had the capability to attack US forward deployed bases during the 1996 cross-strait crisis, 
the new capabilities of coordinating attacks and having the capacity to attack US C4ISR 
would allow China to direct its missile forces towards Taiwan. 
 
Research Hypothesis 
Upon review of the literature on how China’s military technological advancements 
affect the United States ability to aid Taiwan in a cross-strait conflict, it appears that 
China’s military advancements integrated with a strategy to deny the United States access 
to the theater of operations would negatively affect the United States ability to intervene 
in a cross-strait conflict. Unlike previous US intervention in the Taiwan Strait when the 
United States could rely on its technological and military superiority, the technological 
advancements that China has made, especially pertaining to its missile force and C4ISR 
attack capabilities, will force the United States to reassess its strategy and capabilities, 
along with its willingness to intervene. Since China’s military equipment is not combat 
proven in the field, it is difficult to predict any affects that China’s military advancements 
would have on the outcome of a cross-strait conflict involving Taiwan and the United 
States. However, in a scenario where China has achieved a fully operational arsenal of 
technologically advanced equipment, as mentioned throughout this paper, it seems 
inconceivable that the US navy would be able to gain access to the locus of conflict, 
forcing the US navy further or outside the theater of operations. Without the operational 
support of the navy, any US military bases in the region would be held hostage. In the 
end, the combination of operating further from the locus of conflict and China’s ability to 
62 
 
hold US bases hostage will force the United States to seek non-military countermeasures 
such as diplomacy or economic sanctions. 
 
If China’s Military Reached Technological Maturity and a Cross-
Strait Conflict Ensued 
Since the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait conflict there have been only a few instances of 
heightened tension between the United States and China in which the possibility of 
damaged relations or war may have been on the horizon. In 1999 US intelligence errors 
led to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s accidental bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia during the campaign against Serbian forces in 
Kosovo.
247
 In 2001 a United States EP-3E reconnaissance plane collided with a Chinese 
fighter, forcing the United States spy plane to make an unauthorized emergency landing 
on China’s Hainan Island.
248
 The twenty-four-member United States crew was detained 
for a period of twelve days, creating a tense standoff between the two countries.
249
 And 
again tensions were high as arms-transfers between Taiwan and the United States were 
proposed in 2011. China threatened to cut military and bilateral ties with the United 
States if they were to make the sale of 66 F-16 C/D fighters to Taiwan.
250
 So not to 
aggravate United States attempts to deepen relations with China, while adhering to the 
1979 bill passed by Congress that states that the United States is obligated to sell 
weapons to Taiwan for self-defense, the Obama administration selected to compromise 
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and upgrade Taiwan’s existing forces.
251
 To this day the probability of a United States 
war with China over the independence of Taiwan has remained relatively low, despite the 
inkling of Taiwan to assert its independence on occasion. 
Without a period of tension equal or surpassing the 1995-96 cross-strait conflict, a 
comparative study of how China’s military technological advancements would affect the 
Unite States ability to aid Taiwan would be difficult to assess. However, in a hypothetical 
scenario where a cross-strait conflict between China and Taiwan was to occur in the 
present time, counterfactual arguments could be made to assess the United States ability 
to aid Taiwan and how China’s advanced military would constrain US forces. Although 
there can potentially be an infinite number of scenarios, the primary analysis of this study 
will focus on three scenarios depicting how the United States would be constrained if the 
only variable that changed was China’s deployment of a more sophisticated, 
technologically advanced military. Using the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis as a baseline for 
the circumstances in each scenario, a hypothetical explanation for how China might 
deploy its military assets to constrain US forces can be developed. The first scenario will 
illustrate complications that the United States would endure if they selected to send 
carrier groups to the strait to assist Taiwan in a crisis situation with China. The second 
scenario will portray how advancements in China’s military technology would force the 
United States to operate further away from the locus of conflict. And the third scenario 
will depict the political or diplomatic approach that the United States may seek in lieu of 
putting troops at risk. 
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Setting the Stage for the Scenarios 
China has upgraded its niche military capabilities to include its missile forces and 
C4ISR capabilities. Their navy and air force have been moderately upgraded, but still are 
lacking in modern capabilities and would still have to compete with a vastly superior US 
air force and navy. The Taiwanese government has strongly been advocating a push for 
independence, rejecting China’s ‘one country, two systems’ strategy that was prescribed 
for the 1997 handover of Hong Kong to China.
252
 The ultimate goal of attempting to 
institute the ‘one country, two systems’ strategy with Hong Kong was to use it as a 
framework to reunite China and Taiwan.
253
 Taiwan is teetering on the cusp of calling for 
independence and their actions have forced China to mobilize its missile forces, creating 
a defensive perimeter around the theater of operations. During this time the US is 
preparing its forces for a possible conflict with China. 
It is important to keep in mind that even though China is willing to use military force 
against Taiwan, China would most likely refrain from complete destruction of the island 
and civilian infrastructure, in order to ease the rebuilding of the island in the aftermath of 
the conflict. Additionally, China may also attempt to exhibit restraint on causing civilian 
casualties by only targeting military installations to minimize Taiwanese resentment 
toward China. However, it is also important to bear in mind that China will not accept 
Taiwanese independence and it is unclear what actions the Chinese government would be 
willing to take in order to prevent a declaration of Taiwanese independence.  
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It is doubtful that China would attempt to conduct a preemptive kinetic attack against 
US bases in the region. Reasons that China would avoid a preemptive kinetic attack is 
that China would be launching missiles and conducting attacks against allied countries of 
the United States, possibly giving reason for United States allies to involve themselves. 
Another reason that China would refrain from preemptively attacking would be United 
States retaliation for attacking without provocation. The overall consensus in existing 
literature is that China would prefer to deter US military intervention, rather than 
engaging US forces in a “full-on military campaign.”
254
  
By strategically placing its SRBM units to target military installations in Taiwan, 
China can focus its MRBM units on keeping the United States out of the theater of 
operations. While it is most likely true that “China in fact prefers to deter the United 





 In this scenario, the United States selects to intervene despite stern warnings by 
China. If Taiwan declares independence, then China would most likely begin to launch 
its campaign against Taiwan and vice versa. In order to deter and slow down US forces, 
China may attempt a non-kinetic C4ISR attack to degrade US capabilities to coordinate, 
transmit battlefield information, and “transmit early warning information, thus increasing 
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the vulnerability of forward-deployed forces to air and missile attacks.”
256
 Degradation of 
missile defense capabilities would allow China to hold hostage forward deployed bases in 
the region, slowing down the reaction of US troops to respond until defensive systems 
were restored. Additionally, China may select to exercise its option to conduct an 
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack against Taiwan and forces in the western Pacific, 
thus destroying and degrading “key sensors, communications systems, or information 
systems, rendering weapon systems ineffective or command elements unable to 
command, control, and coordinate forces effectively.”
257
 The explosion of an EMP would 
result in the ionization of the atmosphere, disrupting radars and communications 
networks in the region for minutes to hours,
 258
 preventing the US navy from effectively 
projecting power from the sea and with disrupted missile defenses, the carrier groups 
would be handicapped and vulnerable. According to the Electromagnetic Pulse 
Commission the loss of military capability would be catastrophic
259
 for Taiwan and any 
US forces operating in the region.  
With a defense incapable of responding, it would be ill advised for the United States 
to attack until defense capabilities were restored. If China felt that the United States may 
still pursue its efforts to militarily aid Taiwan, it is possible that China may conduct air 
raids and launch missiles to destroy runways at US forward deployed bases and threaten 
to use ASBMs against carrier groups. This is where China’s home field advantage can 
potentially be problematic. If the superiority of the US military technology is such that 
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China’s C4ISR attacks are ineffective, the missile defenses abroad US carrier groups may 
not be able to withstand a barrage of missiles from the mainland, China’s navy, and 
submarine force. While the United States is attempting to hunt for a way to engage 
China, while keeping as many troops as possible out of harm’s way, China would be 
attempting to destroy Taiwan’s defenses in order to begin its amphibious assault.   
Scenario 2         
Similar to the first scenario, China has mobilized and prepared to engage Taiwan. 
After studying the timetables of the United States deployment of carrier groups to the 
Persian Gulf, which took approximately 14 hours,
260
 China understands the amount of 
time it would take the United States to enter the locus of conflict. As US forward 
deployed bases and carrier groups prepare for a possible conflict, China again would 
most likely warn the United States not to intervene unless they want to risk their assets 
and troops. To ensure that the United States doesn’t interfere, China may even issue a 
warning shot toward the edge of the theater of operations to show the United States the 
severity of the situation. As previously stated, the United States would have to select 
whether or not to intervene. In this case, the United States attempts to operate further 
from the locus of conflict to reduce the risk of a C4ISR attack such as in the first scenario 
or a missile attack. The farther that an aircraft carrier operates from the locus of a 
conflict, the less effective it will be in “intercepting enemy air raids, conducting air 
patrols, and carrying out air strikes,” due to transit times.
261
 Due to the ineffectiveness of 
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US carrier groups and having forward deployed bases still at risk to missile attacks, the 
US ability to aid Taiwan again seems highly impaired. 
With US bases held hostage by MRBM missile brigades and US carrier groups 
operating further from the locus of conflict, China’s SRBM brigades are free to 
coordinate and conduct operations to takeout strategic Taiwan defenses. The destruction 
of key defense installations would pave the way for China to conduct an amphibious 
assault operation uninhibited by US naval assets and eventual takeover of the island. 
Scenario 3 
Unlike the other two scenarios where the US military was directed to take a specific 
course of action, scenario three addresses the situation utilizing diplomatic or economic 
means. Nowhere in the Taiwan Relations Act does it state that the United States is 
obligated to militarily assist Taiwan except in providing “defense articles and defense 
services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient 
self-defense capability.”
262
 However, if the United States decided not to act during a 
Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the “failure to defend Taiwan…would drastically reduce 
American credibility and influence in Asia.”
263
 On the other hand, if the risk of losing 
troops and assets in a conflict over Taiwan is too high, the United States might not 
militarily aid Taiwan as during the 1995-1996 cross-strait conflict. This would force the 
United States to take diplomatic and economic courses of action.  
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First the United States can attempt to sway the President of Taiwan and its officials to 
retract or refrain from calling for independence. While this doesn’t resolve any of the 
issues, it does delay the outbreak of war or further conflict. Secondly, the United States 
can continue to militarily bolster Taiwan’s defenses through arms-trades. The idea behind 
this would be to give Taiwan the capability to increase the risk of acquiring Taiwan by 
decreasing China’s benefit of unifying Taiwan. The end being that China would lose 
interest over time since the cost of acquiring Taiwan would be too great a risk. A third 
course of action would be to attempt to unify Taiwan with China under a “one country, 
two systems” strategy that would adhere to strict rules that delineate the two forms of 
government and authority. While this may not be the most stable course of action, 
resulting in clashes between governments, the risk of conflict between the two countries 
could be decreased since China has accomplished its goal of reunifying Taiwan with 
China.  
Last but not least, the United States could place economic sanctions, boycotts, and 
embargoes on China and attempt to stifle their expanding economy. As noted in the 
previous chapter, the United States is China’s largest overseas market and “second largest 
source of its foreign investment.”
264
 As a country that is already facing a multitude of 
economic issues, the closing of any key markets would be detrimental to the health of 
China’s economy and would raise unemployment to hazardous levels, create increased 
social unrest, and further expand poverty.  
While this option has the potential of being a very effective method to addressing the 
potential conflict, attached to this option are possible economic repercussions for the 
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United States. As one of the United States’ main bankers, China could attempt to sell 
large chunks of its dollar holdings, therefore flooding the market with dollars reducing its 
value. However, this reaction by China remains unlikely for two reasons: 1) selling off 
large denominations would “decrease the value of China’s remaining dollar-denominated 
assets”
265
 and 2) such a move would diminish the United States’ demand for China’s 
imports, “either through a rise in the value of the RMB against the dollar or a reduction in 
U.S. economic growth.”
266
 While an economic retaliation on China’s behalf seems 
unlikely, it is important to remember that states do not always act rationally and China in 
the past has threatened to sell off large denominations of US debt.   
Analysis of Scenarios 
All three scenarios show ways in which China’s military technology may coerce the 
United States into pursuing a course of action different from the 1996 cross-strait 
conflict. The application of military technology, along with China’s home field 
advantage, would allow China’s military to conduct operations against the US navy and 
forward deployed bases without putting military hardware or personnel within range of 
adversarial projectiles. Throughout the readings and the way that the scenarios were used 
to exemplify China’s use of military technology, one constant has remained throughout 
the study. While members of the Chinese government have stated their willingness to use 
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction against the United States in a 
conflict over Taiwan, China appears to want to employ a strategy that deters and avoids 
the loss of American lives. Although missiles are destructive in nature, the use of missiles 
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in a deterrence strategy essentially gives the United States a way of avoiding conflict. 
Any kinetic preemptive attack that China would pursue on the United States would likely 
be considered an act of war by the United States, resulting in a retaliatory response. 
According to Pradun, it is understood by Chinese leadership that if they were to bring the 
United States into a “military conflict to reverse a Taiwanese declaration of 
independence…it would have no chance of prevailing.”
267
 While Taiwan might valiantly 
defend its territory, the conclusion resulting from the analysis of the first two scenarios is 
that Taiwan would be left on its own militarily.  
However, analysis of the third scenario suggests that non-military response could be a 
viable option in the event of a cross-strait conflict. While the United States cannot force 
China to accept a “one country, two systems” strategy, the United States can continue to 
urge Taiwan not to claim independence which should keep tensions between China and 
Taiwan from rising. In the meantime, the United States could continue to bolster 
Taiwan’s defenses, making the country a more formidable opponent against China and 
increasing the risk of acquiring Taiwan. Finally, if tensions between China and Taiwan 
began to rise to a point where both countries were on the cusp of going to war, the United 
States could threaten to use economic sanctions to diffuse the conflict.  
Conclusion 
The conclusion of this paper is that the US navy’s bold intervention during the 1996 
Taiwan Strait conflict and the confidence that the United States could sail to Taiwan 
uncontested in a future cross-strait conflict no longer exists due to the military 
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technological advancements that China has invested in. While the United States may 
have the most powerful and technologically advanced navy in the world, the investments 
that China has made were tailored to China’s military strengths and US military 
weaknesses. The conundrum that China’s military technological advancements place at 
the floor of the United States is how to apply the strengths of a superior navy and air 
force to a region that cannot be infiltrated without China unleashing a salvo of missiles 
upon US assets. Additionally, it would be difficult to assess the effectiveness of China’s 
military technology in a warfare scenario since they have never conducted a campaign 
against the United States. The entire world marveled at the technological superiority that 
the United States had obtained during the first Gulf War and China understood that they 
could not stand toe-to-toe with the United States in a conventional war. However the 
advancements in military technology, although untested in combat, and the idea that 
China has gained the capability to attack US C4ISR, has forced the United States to 
reassess its ability to aid Taiwan in a cross-strait battle and counter China’s military 
technological advancements.  
Although a military option may currently no longer be the best suited course of action 
for either aiding Taiwan or keeping China at bay, the United States’ economic option 
shows great promise. While many in the United States view China’s holding of large 
amounts of US debt as a threat, China itself has recognized that not diversifying its 
portfolio could be potentially hazardous. As a result, many of China’s leaders have 
expressed concerns over the safety of holding large amounts of US debt and are 
73 
 
advocating either diversifying away from US Treasury securities or placing restrictions to 
slow the accumulation of federal exchange reserves.
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How do Chinese Anti-Satellite Advancements Affect U.S. 
Space-Based Military Advantages? 
Introduction 
Leading the way and dominating space and space-denial capabilities, the United 
States (US) has had an unparalleled military advantage with their intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites. However, the technological 
advancements that China has made in the field of direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) 
weaponry now threatens US space assets and has given Washington cause for concern. 
On January 11, 2007 the Chinese launched a direct-ascent ASAT weapon which 
successfully struck a defunct Chinese FY-1 weather satellite in low Earth orbit (LEO).
269
  
The success of China’s direct ascent ASAT testing demonstrates their military modernity, 
sophistication, and increasing advancements in ASAT weaponry. The success of the test 
begs the question of how capable are China’s direct ascent ASAT weapons, what are the 
vulnerabilities of US ISR satellites, and what can the United States do in response to 
China’s developing ASAT programs. 
This paper will assess the success of China’s direct ascent ASAT demonstration and 
seeks to answer how the United States can respond to the emerging threat of a possible 
deployment of a Chinese direct ascent ASAT arsenal through military, diplomatic, and 
technological means. Through existing literature, this paper will examine the capabilities 
and implications of China’s direct ascent ASAT program and how the deployment of a 
future direct ascent ASAT arsenal will threaten US ISR satellite capabilities in LEO. The 
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remainder of this paper will focus on diplomatic, military, and technological responses in 
which the United States would be able to combat this emerging threat. 
Unlike other conventional domains or theaters of operation, such as land, sea, and air; 
the notion of space developing into the fourth domain of warfare remains relatively new 
and untested as the vast majority of international rules and strategies pertaining to assets 
in space are still in an infant stage. Based on the current known capabilities of China’s 
direct ascent ASAT weaponry, China has proven their ability to successfully target and 
destroy assets in space. With no account or case study to use as a basis or illustration of a 
state actively seeking to destroy space assets of an enemy state during a time of war, this 
paper will examine the implications of China deploying direct ascent ASAT technology 
based off the successful testing and the resulting damage caused by its direct ascent 
ASAT trial.  
The conclusion of this paper acknowledges the success of China’s direct ascent 
ASAT weaponry and recognizes this technology as a legitimate threat to US space assets; 
however, an increasing globalized world, foreign dependency on satellites, and the 
launching of foreign satellites in space will act as a deterrent and enhance efforts on 
protecting space assets.  
Methodology 
 To assess how the future deployment of China’s direct ascent ASAT weaponry 
threatens US space assets and how the United States can develop a response, this paper 
will rely on counterfactual arguments. As previously stated, the basis of this paper is 
existing literature on the topic of the implications resulting from China’s successful trial 
of its direct ascent ASAT weapon in early January of 2007 and how the weapon is a 
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persisting threat towards US space assets. In order to understand why China’s 
development of a direct ascent ASAT weapon is a critical threat towards US space assets, 
a brief background on the origination of direct ascent ASAT weaponry will be provided. 
While the background section does suggest underlying reasons for commencing the 
development of China’s direct ascent ASAT program, the section of this paper titled The 
Chinese Threat and Their Intentions provides additional theories and examines China’s 
counterspace and military doctrine.  
Following a brief background on the origin of direct ascent ASAT weaponry, it is 
necessary to discuss the implications surrounding the successful trial of China’s direct 
ascent ASAT weapon and briefly illustrate why direct ascent ASAT weaponry is more 
dangerous than other types of weapons that could impede satellite functions. 
Additionally, this follow-on section will discuss the known capabilities of China’s direct 
ascent ASAT weapon, as well as drawbacks and weaknesses, and potential strategic 
applications. 
The succeeding section will then discuss the varying capabilities that US satellites in 
LEO provide for both the United States and world, and the United States and global 
repercussions resulting from the destruction of satellites. Additionally, this section will 
address satellite vulnerabilities, United States doctrine with regards to protecting US 
space assets, and a look forward as the United States prepares to improve their defensive 
posture in space.  
 Based on limited information regarding the future of China’s direct ascent ASAT 
weapons program and its implications for the United States remaining largely 
80 
 
speculative, since there is a lack of policies and space continues to emerge as a domain of 
war, this paper attempts to draw out the discussion of the significance of China’s direct 
ascent ASAT program and answer how the United States could respond to this 
developing threat. This paper will discuss a myriad of responses to include diplomatic 
actions, technological responses, and military options.          
Definitions of Terminology 
 Throughout this paper the term ASAT or direct ascent ASAT will be utilized 
frequently. For the purposes of better understanding the discussion in this paper, this 
section will briefly define the terminology utilized. The term anti-satellite (or its acronym 
ASAT) is a military term that refers to any type of weapon that can be used to either 
maim or destroy a satellite. Direct ascent is one type of ASAT weapon that can be used to 
bring down satellites in the exo-atmosphere. A direct ascent ASAT weapon consists of a 
missile armed with a kinetic kill vehicle
270
 and a platform in which the missile is 
launched from (i.e. a fighter jet, naval vessel, or transporter-erector-launcher [TEL]). A 
missile armed with a kinetic kill vehicle differs from a conventional missile as it does not 
have a warhead and relies on the release of destructive energy when striking an object at 
high speeds, resulting in the disintegration of both vehicles.
271
  
 Other types of ASAT weaponry include lasers that have the ability to blind 
satellite’s optical sensors, radio frequency weapons that “fire an intense burst of radio 
energy at a satellite… [disabling] its electronic components,” and directed energy 
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weapons that have the ability to jam signals to the satellite.
272
 As the focus of this paper is 
on direct ascent ASAT weaponry, any references to other types of ASAT weaponry will 
be explicitly noted. All other uses of the term ASAT or direct ascent ASAT will be made 
in reference to a missile armed with a kinetic kill vehicle. 
Background: A Brief History of Direct Ascent ASAT Testing  
 The advent of direct ascent ASAT weaponry began two years after the successful 
launch of Sputnik,
273
 the first artificial earth satellite created by the Soviet Union. On 
September 22, 1959, the United States pioneered the first direct ascent ASAT weapon, 
launching a missile from a jet at 35,000ft in an attempt to intercept the Explorer V 
satellite.
274
 Roughly three weeks later, the United States attempted another intercept, this 
time successfully targeting and destroying Explorer VI satellite.
275
 The United States 
continued to make advancements in the area of direct ascent ASAT weaponry and 
conducted tests up until 1970.
276
  
Beginning in 1960, after witnessing the United States ability to successfully destroy a 
satellite in orbit, the Soviet Union began to develop their ASAT program producing their 
first tested prototypes in 1967.
277
 Progression towards an effective and efficient Soviet 
ASAT weapon was well on its way as the Soviets recorded close to twenty tests between 
1968 and 1982.
278
 The continuing strides that the Soviets were making in 1976 renewed 
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United States interests and led to the United States developing a kinetic-energy ASAT 
missile launched from an F-15 fighter. 
It was at this point in the development process the Carter Administration “declared 
that ‘verifiable, comprehensive limits on anti-satellite capabilities were in the US national 
security interest,’” and commenced attempting negotiations to address ASAT warfare.
279
 
However, negotiations fell through when the United States unveiled the Space Shuttle. 
The Soviets believed that the arm of the Space Shuttle could be used to capture their 
satellites and stow them in the cargo bay where they could be held and returned to 
Earth.
280
 Furthermore, negotiations failed when neither country could agree on what 
constitutes a space weapon.
281
  
As negotiations faded, ASAT testing continued until September 1985 when the 
United States Air Force “crashed an ASAT homing vehicle” into a solar research satellite 
at an altitude of 525 km.
282
 The satellite known as Solwind P78-1 broke into 285 
detectable pieces of debris which remained in orbit for almost a decade.
283
 Despite 
“Soviet leader Yuri Andropov announcing a unilateral moratorium on ASAT tests in 
1983,”
284
 it took the remnants of space debris to halt further testing out of fear that an 
accumulation of debris in orbit could harm future satellite operations in space.  
It would take over twenty years before the shot heard around the world would shatter 
the silence. This time, however, the ASAT test would not be conducted by the United 
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States, or by the former Soviet Union (Russia). China had broken the silence in early 
January 2007, demonstrating their ability to destroy satellites in Earth’s orbit. The 
interception and destruction of their weather satellite flew at altitudes consistent with US 
ISR satellites
285
 and proved China had taken a great military leap forward. 
It was during the 1991 Gulf War that the United States had first highlighted its 
enormous tactical and military advantages facilitated by the use of satellites in warfare. 
China watched as a large, but antiquated Iraqi army, similar in size and capabilities to 
China’s military fell with relative ease.
286
 In 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 
United States again displayed its military prowess and superiority, exhibiting their 
“reliance on sophisticated command, control, communications (C3) and… (ISR) systems 
operating in space.
287
 On the sidelines and taking notes, China also recognized the US 
military’s increasing reliance on satellite capabilities, leading China to develop an ASAT 
program to exploit US satellite vulnerabilities. According to China’s military strategists, 
an asymmetric response to US space capabilities could possibly provide China’s military 
with a fighting chance in a future Sino-US conflict.
288
   
Although China’s direct ascent ASAT trial justified celebration on behalf of the 
Chinese military, the test conjured an intense international backlash and condemnation.
289
 
The success of China’s ASAT trial created some 35,000 shards of space debris larger 
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than a centimeter and roughly 1,500 shards larger than 10 centimeters according to 
NASA’s Orbital Debris Program.
290
 The creation of space debris as a result of China’s 
ASAT test is considered to be the worst single debris event in the history of LEO 
operations.
291
 Although the United States would echo the test one year later during 
Operation Burnt Frost, the backlash received by the United States would not be nearly as 
severe despite some in the international community remaining skeptical of the 
rationale.
292
 During the operation, President George W. Bush elected to shoot down 
intelligence satellite USA-193 to prevent an uncontrolled atmospheric re-entry and halt a 
450 kilogram fuel tank from crashing into a populated area and releasing toxic gases.
293
 
As China cried hypocrisy in response to the US ASAT operation, which they were 
convinced was a show of force, the debris left by the United States operation was 
conducted at such a low orbit that the majority of debris burnt up in the atmosphere in 
less a year.
294
   
The Chinese Threat and Their Intentions 
The Chinese ASAT weapon, designated the SC-19, is a “two stage, solid-fuel 
medium-range ballistic missile”
295
 (MRBM) armed with a kinetic kill vehicle, which may 
be mounted on a mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL).
296
 In the past China has 
publicized its ability to temporarily disable US space assets with more traditional 
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counterspace capabilities such as radar jammers and lasers;
297
 however the advent of 
direct ascent weaponry has given China offensive counterspace capabilities to 
permanently damage or destroy satellites in LEO. The destruction of China’s own 
satellite in LEO was performed under controlled testing conditions and only 
demonstrated limited capability of direct ascent ASAT.
298
 Prior to the successful ASAT 
test, China had conducted several previous tests using the SC-19 system; however the 
exact configurations of the previous tests remain unknown and were unsuccessful.
299
 
While there are a number of plausible reasons for why China selected to test its’ ASAT 
capabilities, the most likely reason is that the test remains consistent with “China’s notion 
of active defense and its deterrence doctrine.”
300
 Still, others believe that the ASAT test 
capabilities by China was deliberately intended as an act of deterrence against the United 
States and to demonstrate that they would not be shut out of space.
301
 Others suggested 
intentions include the flexing of China’s military muscles, preparing for a possible future 
conflict over Taiwan with the upcoming Taiwan elections in 2012,
302
 and attempting to 
“force the US to the negotiating table for a space arms control treaty.”
303
 Regardless of 
the reasons for the direct ascent ASAT testing, the success of the test has shown the 
United States that China is capable of disabling US ISR satellites in similar LEO.  
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 Given the “increasing economic interdependence and ongoing efforts in both 
countries to improve relations,”
304
 it is becoming increasingly unlikely that the United 
States and China would go to war. Although the probability of war between China and 
the United States remains low, the United States is concerned that China may deploy a 
substantial direct ascent ASAT arsenal,
305
 creating a potential threat to US space assets. 
China has long witnessed the US military’s increasing reliance on ISR capabilities for 
“communication, reconnaissance, geo-positioning and integration capabilities”
306
 and in 
response has created asymmetric capabilities to exploit  potential United States 
vulnerabilities. Although China’s military space doctrine and intentions remain unclear, 
the steps that China is taking are similar to how countries in comparable situations react 
when their national security is threatened: develop military capabilities that target the 
vulnerabilities of the stronger potential adversary.
307
 Although there is much ambiguity, 
there is some suggestion that China is “moving toward a doctrine of deterrence in 
offensive counterspace capability”
308
 patterned on its strategic weapons doctrine and 
policy.  
Looming in the background is a potential Taiwan contingency with the upcoming 
presidential election. In this potential conflict China’s first primary objective would be to 
compromise the United States ability to use ISR satellites at the tactical level.
309
 The 
costs and risks of United States intervention if conflict broke out between Taiwan and 
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China have dramatically increased with the advent of China’s direct ascent weaponry. 
Many experts believe that China would preemptively strike US space assets therefore 
compromising the ability of the United States to operate in the Pacific region.
310
 On 
China’s behalf, this task would be difficult since they would first need to identify and 
track the correct satellites in LEO and then preposition their SC-19 systems to “remote 
areas determined by satellite orbits.”
311
 If China could avoid detection and a United 
States preventative strike, China would still only be able to strike LEO satellites in line of 
sight since satellites are consistently orbiting Earth. By this time, China would have 
elicited a military response from the United States and other orbiting satellites would 
have re-positioned over China. 
Simply stated, China has procured the capability to destroy US ISR and other 
satellites in LEO. While China’s intentions remain somewhat clouded, it should be 
apparent that the development of China’s direct ascent capabilities were most likely 
intended to be used against US space assets in the event that a conflict broke out between 
the two countries.     
 
ISR Satellite Vulnerabilities 
In the National Space Policy authorized by President Bush in 2006, there is a passage 
that identifies space capabilities as a top national priority and affirms the right of the 
United States to protect its space assets and respond to interference.
312
 The unveiling and 
success of China’s direct ascent ASAT weaponry as an asymmetric capability has vastly 
increased the vulnerability of US ISR and other satellites in LEO. Satellites at immediate 
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risk include “US military satellites used for reconnaissance, remote sensing, surveillance, 
electronic surveillance, and meteorology, as well as…civilian communications satellites 
with military applications.”
313
 The “destruction…and even the threat of their destruction 
could have devastating”
314
 United States and world economic consequences, in addition 
to military corollaries.
315
 Satellites such as GPS, communications, US early warning, and 
nuclear command and control communications are located in medium, high, and 
geostationary orbits, and are not vulnerable to China’s direct ascent weaponry.
316
   
Of all the countries in the world, the United States is the most reliant on space assets 
and consequently the most vulnerable to the disruption of its space capabilities.
317
 The 
current national space policy explicitly states that the United States remains committed to 
the use of space systems to support national security and enable defense and intelligence 
operations.
318
 As noted before, the United States will ‘preserve its rights, capabilities, and 
freedom of action in space… [and] dissuade or deter others from either impeding those 
rights or developing capabilities to do so.’
319
 The 2006 National Space Policy states that 
the United States should continue to pursue the development capabilities and plans to 
ensure the freedom of the United States to act in space and deny such freedoms to 
adversaries if called upon.
320
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Satellites are fragile, sensitive, and expensive pieces of equipment that orbit the earth 
at speeds of 17,000 miles per hour.
321
 The cost of attempting to defend satellites 
undeniably outweighs the cost of developing ASAT weaponry and procuring the 
technology to defend space assets will be technologically difficult and expensive to 
develop. The current National Space Policy remains ambiguous and terse with regards to 
United States space deterrence policy. Although the United States does not mention a 
nuclear deterrence, the option to retaliate with nuclear weapons has been left open and is 
“firmly anchored in a doctrine of deterrence”
322
 if United States vital interests are 
attacked. Since President Bush publically declared that US space assets are an integral 
and vital interest, it would be logical to suggest that these assets would be protected under 
a nuclear deterrence.  
Naturally, if China was to deploy direct ascent ASATs, they would instantly become 
high priority targets along with any Chinese space object tracking and jamming facilities. 
In an address to Congress, General James E. Cartwright stated that the United States is 
“prepared to strike-land based Chinese ASAT[s]…if China shoots down US satellites.”
323
 
A statement such as this would assist in deterring China from attacking US satellites in a 
crisis situation, however if the situation called for the United States to act in such a 
manner, the United States would inflict casualties on the ground and risk escalation.
324
  
Placing significant emphasis on protecting its space assets, the United States has gone 
through considerable lengths to improve their defensive posture in space. In the current 
National Space Policy, the United States seeks to “ensure cost effective survivability of 
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space capabilities…and supporting information systems and networks.”
325
 Currently, 
there are few economically viable defensive solutions to protect space assets. As stated 
before, defensive satellite technologies are more difficult to develop and more costly than 
attacking weaponry.
326
 Defensive options and modifications currently available include 
stealth, maneuverability,
327
 and the ability to harden satellites. In a Presidential memo, 
Bush called for countering strategies and funding to procure technologies especially in 
the area of space situational awareness (SSA).
328
 SSA is the United States ability to track 
and understand objects in orbit. Improvements in SSA that the United States is pursuing 
are the ability to attribute all activity in circumterrestrial space in real time, including 
“birth to death tracking and [an] assessment of all threats” to US space assets.
329
 
Acquiring such capabilities would allow the United States to attribute an attack to a 
particular adversary and respond accordingly.             
In terms of preemptive actions, the National Space Policy states that the United States 
is seeking to promote developmental technology, improve industrial capacity, and 
maintain a robust supplier.
330
 Although this description is vague, it insinuates that the 
United States is pursuing a quick, cheap response for replacement satellites. Known as 
operationally responsive space (ORS) capabilities, the United States could offset the 
attacks on their space assets by maintaining the capacity to quickly replace satellites with 
spares or satellites of lesser quality.
331
 OSR satellites could also be applied preemptively, 
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adding increased capability, demonstrating political intent,
332
 and creating more 
confusion for the adversary.  
From a preventative perspective, the National Space Policy stresses cooperation 
between relevant departments, agencies, and commercial and foreign entities in order to 
rapidly “detect, warn, characterize, and attribute natural and man-made disturbances to 
space systems of US interest.”
333
 Based on SSA, early detections of non-friendly objects 
can assist in alerting national ballistic missile defense interceptors or allow the air force 
to attempt to maneuver satellites out of harms way. However, the main preventative 
measure that the United States might exact is varying degrees of diplomacy. While 
dialogue on weaponizing space has been limited, the United States has voluntarily agreed 
to debris limitations and safe space operational practices.
334
 The space debris caused by 
China’s ASAT test increased orbital debris by 10 percent and its fallout will take at least 
one-hundred years before it re-enters Earth’s atmosphere.
335
 The destruction of the 
defunct FY-1 satellite disbursed at least 35,000 shards of debris at speeds of 4,000 km/h 
into various orbits.
336
 While China has joined the United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament (UNCD) “to promote a treaty to ban all weapons in space,”
337
 the United 
States openly opposed this ban. The only way that the United States would agree on a 
treaty to ban weapons in space is if arms controls measures “are equitable and effectively 
verifiable and enhance the security of the”
338
 United States and its allies. Additionally, 
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the ASAT test performed by China does little to comfort and bring the United States to 
the negotiating table. 
 
How the United States Should Respond: Diplomatically, Militarily, 
and Technologically 
Military Options 
The National Space policy provides general guidelines, but is ambiguous and has 
shortfalls. In a military strategy forum at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS), Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III acknowledges that the 
current space policy (from the Obama Administration) is the first strategic document 




A military response suggested by Gen. Cartwright at the CSIS forum was to 
emphasize cross-domain capabilities to withhold a single point of failure.
340
 Giving 
satellites multiple capabilities will ensure redundancy and increase the complexity of the 
space network, requiring the adversary to shoot down more satellites. With regards to 
hard power, the United States could increase defensive spending and pursue the 
weaponization of space assets in order to gain offensive and defensive counterspace 
capabilities if China continued to pursue direct ascent ASAT weaponry.  
A military and economic hard power that the United States can employ is to enhance 
restrictions on the arms embargo that has been in place against China since the 
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Tiananmen Square protests in 1989.
341
 During this period, the European Union had 
imposed a similar arms embargo on China.
342
 An increase in restrictions could extend 
beyond military assets to include various goods. In recent years the European Union had 
considered lifting the ban on arms trades with China and in early October of 2010, 
President Barack Obama “issued a waiver loosening Tiananmen arms sanctions for C-
130 military transports.”
343
 While China currently views the waiver as a long awaited 
step toward completely lifting the ban, the imposition of a stricter ban could be used to 
coerce China into signing a treaty banning the use and production of direct ascent ASAT 
weapons. If China were to agree to a ban on the production and usage of ASAT weapons 
in exchange for lifting the sanctions, China would have to become more transparent in 
their operations and offer a way to verify that they are not covertly producing direct 
ascent ASAT weapons.  Additionally, the United States could attempt to strengthen the 
embargo by gaining the support of their European allies and making a stronger push for 
China to make concessions. 
Diplomatic Response 
A political and economic suggestion by Secretary Lynn and Gen. Cartwright was the 
idea of creating partnerships with other countries. Not only would the costs of developing 
new assets be split between countries, but deterrence would be enhanced because an 
attack by an adversary on a space constellation would be an attack on multiple 
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 The United States currently owns two-thirds of the world’s satellites and as 
mentioned earlier, the destruction of satellites could have adverse effects on the world 
economy. Since the United States economy is so vested in satellite systems (e.g. so much 
information and business is conducted through space)
345
 and the Chinese have been 
buying up US debt, destruction of satellites and the creation of debris would only 
perpetuate the mutual destruction of United States, Chinese, and world economies. 
According to Gen. Cartwright, the calculus for being “a bad actor in space” would 
inevitably be the denial of space services.
346
 Not only would the denial of space assets 




In terms of pursuing a soft power in the political realm, the United States could work 
towards persuading China that they are willing to consider a treaty to prevent an arms 
race in outer space (PAROS) under the condition that China would be willing to become 
more transparent and halt the development and production of direct ascent ASAT 
weaponry.
347
 In this compromise each country gets what they desire, however this would 
require the United States and China to create an effectively verifiable system and require 
a third party institution such as the United Nations to conduct inspections. Since there is 
no foolproof plan, each country should start with dialogue and confidence-building 
measures to improve relations.
348
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An informational and psychological hard power that the United States can employ is 
to cast shame and “doubt on China’s reliability as a global partner.”
349
 The Chinese 
ASAT test conducted was done at the expense and safety of Chinese, United States, and 
other foreign satellites in LEO and the debris will continue to endanger these systems for 
decades.
350
 Furthermore, evidence indicates that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
acted without the consent and knowledge of China’s security and foreign policy 
bureaucracy.
351
 This undoubtedly brings up the question, does Chinese President Hu 
Jintao, who heads the PLA as the chair of the Central Military Commission and is the 
Chinese Communist Party general secretary, have control of the country?
352
 And if so, 
what are China’s real intentions? Although China has declared the pursuit of peaceful 
space interests and a multilateral treaty to ban space weapons within the UNCD, the 
United States can now declare to the international community that China’s real impetus is 
toward military space utility.
353
 China’s ASAT test showed a lack of concern for other 
country’s space assets and the United States can embellish this information, making 
known China’s lack of transparency and their mistrust.
354
 From a psychological 
perspective, the spread of this information can be destructive to the international 
community’s views on China as a peaceful rising power. International concern coupled 
with increased scrutiny over China’s actions could lead to political and economic 
sanctions against China. 
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Technological Alternatives  
 Improvements in satellite technology or other protective defensive measures are 
deeply rooted in a military response due to the primary function and capabilities of ISR 
satellites. As noted in the previous section titled ISR Satellite Vulnerabilities, many of the 
technological options are not financially viable, are difficult to develop, and have greater 
associated escalatory risk.
355
 Technological advancements that would exacerbate 
escalation includes the weaponization of space assets. Weaponizing space assets, even if 
the weapons are purely defensive in nature, is problematic simply due to the fact that 
satellites orbit earth. While weaponized satellites orbiting earth could potentially provide 
lethal or non-lethal offensive or defensive US quick strike capabilities as satellites flew 
over intended targets, ally and neutral states would have weapons pointed at them as the 
satellites continued on its orbital path. Consequences for deploying such a system would 
be intense backlash from the international community and an escalation in the 
development of ASAT weaponry and weaponized space assets. While getting allies and 
neutral countries onboard with weaponizing space via a treaty or joint agreement may 
alleviate some of the backlash from the international community, countries not on the list 
would escalate their efforts of developing ASAT weaponry. 
 As of 2008 the United States has made no mention of “any offensive space programs 
it may develop,” and has continued to focus on improved SSA and protection.
356
 In order 
to ensure survivability of its satellites in LEO, the United States needs to search for cost 
effective technologies to augment its satellite constellations. Improving SSA would 
provide real time data of objects in space and early warning detection of non-friendly 
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objects, allowing the air force to attempt to maneuver satellites out of harm’s way and 
increasing survivability. Hardening satellites, equipping satellites with stealth technology, 
increasing their maneuverability, giving satellites multiple capabilities are also all viable 
options for increasing survivability. As previously stated, OSR satellites are another 
alternative for bolstering capabilities during times of crisis or for offsetting satellites that 
were damaged or destroyed. Lastly, non-space backup systems that are actively being 
utilized today by the military include unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ground-
based signal and communications transmitters which can be used to augment satellite 
capabilities.
357
 While these non-space systems may not offer the same functionality or 
durability of a satellite, they cost less than a replacement satellite.
358
 In the end, 
distributing space capabilities across a large and diverse set of space and non-space 
platforms reduces the vulnerability of space assets and aids in preventing adversaries 




 In order for the United States to respond to China’s development of direct ascent 
ASAT weaponry, the United States needs to take a multifaceted approach. An 
amalgamation of military, technological, and diplomatic actions is needed to increase ISR 
satellite survivability to its maximum potential. If the United States were to only make 
technological advancements to satellites, there would be nothing to deter the China from 
launching a direct ascent ASAT missile at a US satellite during a crisis or war. Vice 
versa, if the United States were to only pursue a diplomatic response, the United States 
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might be able to provide some disincentives, but satellite capabilities would still be at 
risk. States are not always rational actors and even if the United States were to develop 
joint satellite ventures, there would be nothing to protect satellites in LEO against an 
irrational actor. While taking a multifaceted approach to responding to the Chinese 
ASAT threat does not eliminate the threat, it drastically reduces China’s ability to hit US 
satellites in orbit and provides varying levels of deterrence.     
Although China has only proven its direct ascent ASAT capabilities under limited 
and controlled conditions, the issue of China potentially developing a direct ascent ASAT 
arsenal warrants continued discussion and concern. While China’s development of a 
direct ascent ASAT program suggests military preparedness for a potential Sino-US 
conflict, possibly over a Taiwan invasion scenario, the intent of exhibiting their 
capabilities remains somewhat blurred since the dangers of conducting such a test are 
well documented. The debris created by the destruction of satellites by direct ascent 
ASAT weapons is detrimental to future space operations and the remains from the 
destruction of intended targets could inadvertently destroy other existing satellites in 
orbit. 
 As the United States is a country that is the most heavily invested in satellite 
constellations, both for military and civilian applications, China has zeroed in on an 
invaluable asset. Satellites remain one of the key sources of military superiority, 
command, and control for the US military and are essential for the functioning of the 
United States, as well as the global economy. As a result, the destruction of satellites 
could have adverse repercussions for both the United States and global economy, to 
include China since they are so heavily intertwined with the United States.  
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While US doctrine on protecting assets in space remains ambiguous, it is clear that 
the protections of satellites is a high priority national security interest and that an attack 
on such assets will elicit a military response that could potentially comprise of a nuclear 
strike. While actions are being taken to mitigate satellite debris and the destruction of 
satellites in orbit, satellite defense systems remain a costly and complex endeavor, and 
may escalate an arms race if satellite defense systems are placed in space.  
Rather than pursue such a costly protective action, the United States could respond to 
the emerging threat by creating satellites with redundancy features, creating partnerships 
with other countries in order to make an attack on satellites more costly and draw in other 
countries for support, and to work towards a treaty banning direct ascent ASAT 
weaponry. All of the responses mentioned in this paper could be pursued either alone or 
could encompass a multitude of avenues.  
 As evidenced by this paper it is clear that China’s direct ascent ASAT program is 
a legitimate emerging threat to US ISR and other satellites in LEO. China’s successful 
ASAT trial ascertained their ability to touch US assets in space; however, the degree to 
which China’s ASAT program is a threat to US satellites is not quantifiable. As a piece of 
military equipment that is still undergoing developmental testing, and thus not deployed 
to the field, it is difficult to gauge the threat level of this equipment. Moving forward, if 
China decides to deploy an ASAT arsenal, the threat level and China’s willingness to use 
ASAT weaponry in a possible future conflict increases. 
While this threat continues to emerge, this paper concludes that the United States will 
continue to rely on space assets for the foreseeable future. The result for successfully 
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having destroyed a satellite in orbit continues to be met with condemnation and backlash 
from the international community, and places the user state of a direct ascent ASAT 
weapon in an ever growing precarious position. As more states strive to either develop 
their own space constellations or harness the services and capabilities that existing 
satellites provide, increasing real-estate in space by reducing the amount of debris 
orbiting earth escalates the unpopularity and disapproval of using direct ascent ASAT 
weaponry by the international community. The world is quickly becoming more 
dependent and interconnected to satellite capabilities, and as globalization expands, the 
role of satellites will continue to increase. 
Even though the international community is continuing to increase its reliance on 
satellite capabilities, this paper acknowledges that states can act irrationally. In China’s 
case, it remains somewhat unclear who controls the PLA as they acted without the 
consent and knowledge of China’s security and foreign policy bureaucracy when 
conducting the ASAT trial. Acknowledging the ASAT weapon as a legitimate threat, as 
well as recognizing that there may be some ambiguity pertaining to who leads the PLA, 
provides justification that relying on the international community’s condemnation of 
using direct ascent ASAT weaponry may not be enough. Therefore, it is vital that the 
United States continues to pursue plans to protect US space assets. Such endeavors to 
protect US satellite constellations include, but are not limited to, increasing foreign 
dependency on satellites, pursuing a treaty banning direct ascent ASAT weaponry, and 
buttressing current satellite capabilities with replaceable or hardening military options.  
As other states continue to take up real-estate in orbit, the United States is slowly 
losing grasp of its monopoly in space. Although the United States may soon not enjoy the 
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military advantages satellites solely provided to them, the addition of foreign dependency 
on satellites and the launching of their own systems will transfix efforts on protecting 
space assets and creating a safe environment in space. A crucial element of deterrence for 
the United States will be to exploit the international community’s disapproval of direct 
ascent ASAT weaponry. While China may have increased its operational ASAT 
capabilities by incorporating direct ascent weaponry, it seems as though the window for 
acceptable usage of this type of ASAT weaponry is shrinking. As states continue to 
increase their reliance on satellite capabilities and the global economy continues to 
function on satellite based systems, the risk of creating additional debris in space could 
have dire consequences for the country that intentionally creates unwelcome debris in 
orbit. Therefore, China’s direct ascent ASAT weaponry may one day become obsolete, 
unless they manage to create a system that can accurately target and destroy satellites 
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China’s rise and how it affects the United States is an issue that will continue to 
persist as long as China remains on its current path of growth, development, and 
evolution. While the chapters in this portfolio describe varying issues that the United 
States will have to contend with now and in the future, there are still other elements of 
China’s rise that need to be explored in order to gain a more holistic view of what 
China’s rise means for the United States. The varying issues in this portfolio largely 
illustrate but a few specific aspects of how China is evolving and becoming a bigger 
player on the world stage.  
The first chapter of the paper argues that China’s economy, in terms of global 
GDP output, will surpass the United States; however, the United States will continue to 
direct and lead the international community and world economy due to lack of trust in 
China’s government and concerns about China’s political stability and social unrest. 
Despite having an economy that is projected to grow for the next two to three decades, 
China’s economy remains frail and China’s leaders have to begin to address a multitude 
of issues that could slow down its economic growth. A few of these issues include 
growing poverty and wage disparity, social unrest, job placement, unethical practices, 
and growing environmental issues. While the Sino-US economic relationship has eroded 
some US economic instruments of power that might have been used as leverage against 
China to make changes, China may have forced its own hand by letting some of these 
issues run unchecked for far too long. For the United States, the power of their economic 
instruments has waned with regards to China, but the tradeoff to expand its economy has 
worked out favorably in some respects. For many Americans and US policymakers, 
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China purchasing large amounts of US debt remains a concern; however, this paper 
suggests a mutual destruction of both major economies as well as the global economy if 
China were to dump large amounts of US debt. While the scenarios provided imply that 
China has only a few incentives to dump large amounts of US debt, a bigger concern for 
many Americans should be whether or not continued reliance on foreign borrowing is 
sustainable. Exploring ways to rely less on foreign investment, reduce borrowing, and cut 
spending are issues that the United States needs to address. For even if China does not 
deliberately dump its foreign investments, the possibility remains that China’s economy 
could fail. It will be interesting to see how China elects to tackle the prevailing issues that 
surround their economy without slowing down economic growth. Any slowdown in 
economic growth is likely to exacerbate any issues tied to China’s economy. 
Findings in the second chapter suggests that the United State will no longer be 
able to send its navy into the Taiwan Strait uncontested if a conflict were to ensue 
between China and Taiwan. Military advancements that China has made since the mid-
1990s to create an anti-access theater of operation for the United States includes 
developing their own C4ISR capabilities, as well as the ability to attack US C4ISR, 
naval, and air combatants in the region. Although many of China’s capabilities have yet 
to be tested during a period of war, the military technological advancements that China is 
striving for still give cause for extreme caution. Tensions between China and Taiwan 
have remained low since the 1996 Taiwan Strait conflict due to Taiwan not declaring its 
independence at the United States urging. 
The final chapter of this paper argues that the United States will be able to 
continue to rely on its space-based assets despite China’s development of direct ascent 
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ASAT weaponry. As orbiting space real estate becomes increasingly sparse, due to other 
countries investing in space-based assets and existing orbiting debris, the creation of 
more debris in space will only lead to condemnation by the international community. As 
globalization expands, satellites will continue to play an increasingly integral part as new 
countries begin to rely on these assets, therefore shrinking China’s opportunity to use its 
direct ascent ASAT weaponry against its enemies. However, this chapter acknowledges 
that states are not always rational actors, as exhibited by China’s sudden ASAT launch, 
and that the United States needs to invest in securing its space-based assets and must 
consider a multifaceted approach.  
While this paper is able to depict China’s rise through focusing on specific 
subjects and relaying how those particular advancements affect the United States, this 
paper does lack elements that would provide a broader sense of China’s rise. One subject 
that was not dealt with in great detail, but surfaced as a result of the research conducted 
for this paper is the question of who controls China’s military? As research in this 
portfolio has shown, the PLA conducted a direct ascent ASAT launch without the consent 
and knowledge of China’s security and foreign policy bureaucracy. In conjunction with 
the latter question, what are China’s real intentions? While this paper does not delve into 
China’s military command structure and to whom the military reports, unilateral actions 
by the military suggests disagreements between the military commanders and civilian 
authorities on how the country should act with regards to interactions with foreign 
countries and show of force. As a country that has continuously attempted to market its 
rise as one of peace, this show of force undoubtedly echoes concerns that the military 
may have an agenda that differs from China’s civilian leadership. Without knowing 
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whether or not China’s military is truly subordinate to China’s civilian branch of the 
government, it is difficult to assess China’s true intentions. Other aspects of this paper 
that need to be explored in greater detail in order to gain a broader understanding of 
China’s rise and how it affects the United States include research on China’s political 
framework, demographics, and environmental issues.  
In the end this paper successfully explores how the relationship between the 
United States and China is evolving and how those changes are affecting the United 
States. With many more areas in the relationship to explore, it is difficult to assess where 
this relationship is headed. Although China is slowly building and modernizing its 
military, it seems unlikely that a conflict between either country will ensue in the near 
future. While the Sino-US economic relationship does not guarantee that a conflict 
between the two countries or a possible Taiwan Strait conflict won’t occur, the economic 
relationship does provide some stability, or at least an incentive, not to engage in a 
conflict with one another. Although China actively tries to market its rise as a peaceful 
one, China’s military and political actions may suggest otherwise. As the research in this 
paper has suggested, the United States needs to explore methods for reducing debt and 
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